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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited)
liability company,
)
)
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)
vs.
)
)
JULIE G. BARNS ON, an unmarried woman; )
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
)
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
)
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
)
Homecornings Financial, LLC (f/Va
)
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
)
Delaware limited liability company; and
)
DOES 1-10,
)
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)
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Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings. LLC, ("Residential") by and
through its counsel of record, Hmvley Troxell Ennis & I-lawley LLP, respectfully files this Reply
i'vlemorandum in Support of l\'lotion in Limine.

1.
ARGUME:\fT
Residential's Motion in Limine to pennit evidence in the trial conceming the validity of
ParkWest Homes, LLC's ("ParkWest") mechanic's lien (the "Lien") does not implicate the "Imv
of the case" doctrine because

0) many lien-validity issues have not been fully decided in the

previous appeal and (ii) Residential or Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Services,
Inc. ("MERS") could not have raised the lien-validity issues in the earlier appeal. The law oftbe
case doctrine does, hm;vever, bar ParkWest from basing the amount of its Lien on the void and
illegal contract between Julie Bamson ("Bamson") and ParkWest (the "Contract").

A.

The Law Of The Case Doctrine Does Not Bar Residential From Arguing Lien
Validity Issues That Have Not Been Before The Court Previously.
In ParkWest Homes LLC F. Bamson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), the Supreme

C01ll1 did not finally decide all lien-validity issues. Indeed, there simply is no colorable argument

that the Supreme Court decided issues conceming the validity of the Lien outside the context of
the verification and statement of demand requirements of Idaho Code sections 45-507(3)(a) and
45-507(4) and the ldaho Contractor Registration Act.

Park West argues in opposition that "the 'law a/the case' docrrine does prevent future
htigation of all lien-validity issues that could have been raised in the earlier appeal." See
ParkWest's Memorandum in Opposition at 5. This argument is a misinterpretation of the "law' of
the case" doctrine. As noted in Residential's Memorandum in Support of Mation in Limine, the
"Jaw of the case" doctrine "prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that

REPLY MElvl0RANDU}\:1 IN SUPPORT OF MOTJON IN LHvHNE - 2
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might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appea!." Taylor v.l'v1aile, 146 Idaho 705, 709.
201 PJd 1282, 1286 (2009) (emphasis added). ParkWest's argument that the "law of the case"
doctrine prohibits litigation of all issues that theoretically could have been asserted prior to the

first appeal should be rejected for five reasons.
First, it was procedurally impossible for Iv'lERS to argue extraneous lien-validity issues in
the earlier appeal. In its summary judgment motion to this Court, MERS argued successfully that
(i) ParkWest did not comply with Idaho Code sections 45-507(3)(a) and 45-507(4) and Oi)

Park\Vest did not comply with the Idaho Contractor Registration Act. After ParkWest appealed
this Court's summary judgment decision to the Idaho Supreme COUJ1, MERS had no ability to
raise extraneOllS lien issues, as those issues were never before this Court

011

summary judgment.

Consequently, those issues could not have been raised in the earlier appeal, and therefore, the
"law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable in this context.
Second, because MERS was not the appellant before the Supreme COUli, there were no
"alleged en'ors" that it might have raised on appeal. Indeed, it would be illogical to require
MERS to argue that this Court "erred" on lien-validity issues that this Comt never examined.
Third, the "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to the respondent in the first appeal.

See Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 860 P.2d 1 (CL App. 1993). In its Memorandum in
Opposition, ParkWesi argues that the case of Bouten Construction Co, v. HF. A1agnuson Co.,
133 Idaho 756,992 P.2d 751 (1999) "expressly holds that a respondent in a prior appeal cannot
raise issues that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeaL" See Memorandum in
Opposition at 7. (n Bouten, plaintiff-Bouten brought an action against defendant-Magnuson to
collect the amount of the excess in the "Guaranteed Maximum Price" (the "GMP") that was
attributable to the changes in the pJans made periodically by Magnuson during the construction

REPL Y MElvI0Rl\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN UMINE - 3
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ofa hoteL Id. at 759, 992 P.2d at 754. After a full trial on the merits, the district comi held that
l'v[agnuson had not waived the GMP argument. Ie!. Bouten appealed, and the Idaho COUlt of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Magnuson was liable for the additional costs of
changes above the GMP.ld. at 760, 992 P.2d at 755. On remand, without hearing new evidence,
the district court awarded Bouten nearly $300,OOO.1d. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,
Magnuson argued for the first time on appeal "that the contract with Bouten provided that any
savings in the subcontractors' bids over the GMP \vas to be passed on to l'v1agnuson." Id. at 762,
992 P.2d at 757. The Supreme Court refused to hear the argument, holding that Magnuson did
not raise the issue at trial. 1£1.
Bouten is distinguishable because the Idaho Supreme Court only came to its holding after
the district court held a full trial on the merits. Indeed, if Magnuson wished to raise the issue, he
had every opportunity to do so below. In this case, MERS did not have, and Residential has not
had, an opportunity to litigate the extraneous lien-validity issues, as there has not yet been a full
trial on the merits in which MERS or Residential would be required to advance all available
arguments.
Fourth, Residential is a new party to this lawsuit, having intervened after this case \vas
remanded by the Supreme Court. Residential was not a party to the proceedings before this
Court prior to the appeal, nor was it a party to the appeal. Residential has the right to raise issues
that MERS did not raise previously.
Fifth, and most impOltantly, if this Court \vere to accept ParkWest's reasoning, it would
etTectively be adopting the position that a party bringing a motion for summary judgment rnUSl

raise eve;y conceivable issue in fear of application of the "law of the case" doctrine tollo'wing an
unsuccessful appeal--a position that would destroy the efficiency advantages and economical

REPLYMEMORp.NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOnON IN LIMINE - 4
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value of summary judgment motions. Such a result should be rejected by this Comi, and
Residential should not be barred from raising additional issues related to the validity of
ParkWest's Lien.

B.

The Law Of The Case Doctrine Bars Park\Vest From Basing The Amount Of Its
Lien On The Contract.
This Court should also bar ParkWest from using the void and il1egal Contract as a basis

for establishing the amount of its Lien. The Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally confinned that
the Contract between Bamson and ParkWest is void and illegal, Parkwest, 149 Idaho at 608, 238
P.3d at 203 (,'ParkWest does not challenge the district court's holding that the construction
contract was void."), and held that ParkWest has a lien only "for \\1ork or labor [ParkWest]
provided and materials it supplied." Id. Such work or labor cannot include any protlt to
ParkWest that may have been built into the void and illegal Contract.
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ruled that a subcontractor who did not cQntract

\vith a property owner has a lien claim only for the amount of the reasonable value of the service
rendered or the materials provided under a quantum meruit theory:
We do not believe that T & J [the subcontractors] have a basis for
recovery against O.K. [the lando'W'TIer] under a quantum meruit
theory. The general rule in this area is that a subcontractor who
fUl111shes material or labor pursuant to an agreement with, or upon
the order and credit of a general contractor cannot recover against
the property owner upon the basis of an implied promise to pay
arising from the owner's receipt and acceptance oftbe benefit of
the material and labor furnished. Thus it is said that a landowner
will not be held liable for \vork or material furnished by a
subcontractor to a contractor, pursuant to a contractual
anangement between the contractor and subcontractor, where the
landowner is not a party to this contractual arrangement.

REPL Y MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN UMINE - 5
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It is true that there is an exception to this general rule under the
mechanic's lien laws. where if a subcontractor is not paid. he may
enforce his claim for compensation directly against the landowner.

Great Plains Equl~')nJel1t, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline, 132 Idaho 754, 768, 979 P.2d 627,641
(1999) (emphasis added) (citing Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 666-67, 534
P.2d 1102, t 106--07 (1975)). Under the mechanic's lien laws, the Supreme Court held:

In cases where one party has accepted valuable services under
circumstances where he ought to pay, courts have implied a
promise to pay and allowed recovery for the reasonable value of
the services. That reasoning is applicable to situations involving an
attempt by a workman to recover for his services by the lien
procedure.

Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Corporation, 94 Idaho 694,697,496 P.2d 693, 696 (1972).
This reasoning should be applied here: because ParkWest has no contract with Residential, the
Lien should be evaluated according to a quantum meruit theory, or "the reasonable value of the
services rendered or the materials provided." Great Plains Equipment, 132 Idaho at 767, 979 .
P.2d at 640. Such a ruling would comport with the Supreme Comi's language in this case that

the amount of the Lien should be measured by the reasonable value of the "wo'rk or labor ...
provided and materials ... supplied" by Park\Vest, independent of the void and illegal Contract.

II.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Residential respectfully requests that this Court grant the
Motion in Limine.

REPLY MEMORANDUr.;f iN SUPPORT OF MOTJON IN LIMINE - 6
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\1Y-day ofJanuary, 2011.
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

lv)
///
By 1 /
Ryantr. Me 1rland, ISB No. 7347
Attm/ney or Defendant/Counterclaimant
Resitlc ial Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
-vsJULIE BARNSON, MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC,
Defendants,
and
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware
Limited liability company,
Defendant/Intervenor.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-8274

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER, PARKWEST'S
MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS'
MOTION TO DISMISS,
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION IN LIMINE

--------------------------)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER, PARKWEST'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS' MOTION TO DISMISS,
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESIDENTIAL'S
MOTION IN LIMINE - 1

481

Procedural History

This action was initiated by Plaintiff ParkWest Homes, LLC (ParkWest) by Verified
Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7, 2007, followed by the First Amended Complaint filed
on September 12, 2007. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 6, 2008. 1
On January 6, 2009, the Honorable Gordon Petrie2 issued a Memorandum Decision on
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS) Motion for Summary
Judgment granting the motion in favor of MERS. Judgment was entered on January 26, 2009.
Thereafter, ParkWest appealed the matter to the Idaho Supreme Court.

The Idaho

Supreme Court reversed Judge Petrie's decision and remanded this matter to this court on June
28,2010. The Remittitur was issued on July 22, 2010.
On September 14, 2010, ParkWest filed a Supplemental Amended Complaint to
Foreclose Lien. MERS' Answer to Supplemental Amended Complaint was filed on October 7,
2010. On November 10, 2010, this court granted an Order on Stipulation to allow Defendant
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings (Residential) to intervene as a party to this action.
Residential's Answer and Counterclaim on Intervention was filed on November 15, 2010.
ParkWest filed an Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention on November 30, 2010.
On November 12, 2010, MERS filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Protective
Order along with supporting memoranda and affidavits. ParkWest filed an Objection to Motion
to Dismiss MERS on November 29, 2010. MERS' Reply Memorandum was filed on December
7, 2010. ParkWest filed a Motion to Compel along with supporting affidavit on November 23,
2010, and MERS' Opposition to the Motion to Compel was filed on December 2, 2010.
1 ParkWest, MERS and Defendant Julie Barnson stipulated to the entry of default judgment against Barnson on
October 7, 2008.
2 Judge Petrie retired from the bench in January 2009.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER, PARKWEST'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS' MOTION TO DISMISS,
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESIDENTIAL'S
MOTION IN LIMINE - 2

482

ParkWest filed a Reply Memorandum on the Motion to Compel on December 7, 2010. The
Motion to Compel and Motion to Dismiss were scheduled for hearing on December 9, 2010, but
the parties represented on the record that a tentative agreement had been reached to resolve the
pending issues and the motion hearing was vacated.
On November 17, 2010, Residential filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with
ParkWest's Opposition being filed on December 27, 2010. Residential's Reply Memorandum
was filed on January 5, 2011.
On January 5, 2011 Residential filed a Motion in Limine along with supporting
memorandum.

Also filed that day was MERS' Supplemental Memorandum on Motion to

Compel, the Motion to Dismiss, and the Motion for Protective Order. On January 10, 2011,
ParkWest filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine/Surreply to MSJ.
A hearing was held on all pending motions on January 13, 2011. Robert Bums appeared
on behalf of ParkWest, while Ryan McFarland and Jake McGrady appeared on behalf of MERS
and Residential.

Motion to Compel and Motion for Protective Order

Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 30, and 37, ParkWest asks this court to
order MERS to (1) provide substantive responses to discovery requests served on October 13,
2010 and (2) to designate and produce a deposition representative pursuant to IRCP 30(b)(6).
MERS, on the other hand, seeks relief from these discovery requests pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 26( c) because MERS no longer has an interest in the property and is seeking to
be dismissed from this action.
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As noted above, the parties attempted to resolve these issues during an in chambers
meeting prior to the December 2010 motion hearing, however, the parties subsequently disagreed
about whether the terms of the resolution had been satisfied. At the oral argument held on
January 13,2011, counsel for MERS articulated its belief that because MERS no longer has any
interest in the property and because MERS has disclosed its entire file with respect to this
property that it should not be required to respond to additional written discovery and/or an IRCP
30(b)(6) deposition. However, MERS did indicate a willingness to participate in the deposition,
if ParkWest agreed to conduct the deposition at the location where the MERS 30(c)(6) designee
was located. 3 ParkWest is concerned that its ability to try this case would be prejudiced should it
agree to dismiss MERS from this action prior to completing the discovery it deems necessary.
ParkWest also argues that in the absence of certain admissions by MERS, ParkWest may
encounter difficulty introducing MERS documents and information into evidence during trial if
MERS was no longer a party. ParkWest also argues that it should be allowed to conduct the
deposition of MERS designated representative in Idaho to avoid the expense and inconvenience
of travel to the location of the MERS deponent.
During the hearing on these issues, counsel for MERS and Residential made the
representation that since MERS has disclosed its entire file through discovery, that Residential
would not object to ParkWest's offer of the MERS documents on the basis of inadequate source
foundation.

That is, while Residential maintained its right to object to documents on other

grounds, it would not raise an issue as to the validity of the documents. In addition, counsel for
MERS represented to the court that in its discovery responses MERS had admitted that the

3

It was represented to the court that the deponent is located in Texas.
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documents produced are genuine and are accurate copies of the documents retained in the MERS
file which were maintained in the ordinary course of MERS conduct of business.
In addressing another unresolved issue between MERS and ParkWest, counsel for MERS
also asserted that MERS maintains the position that at all times relevant to this action it had
priority over the Park West lien, but that since the foreclosure of the property more particularly
described below, MERS no longer maintains that it has an interest in the property pursuant to
either the first or second deeds of trust recorded.
In light of the foregoing and because ParkWest has not identified for the record other
specific discovery responses that remain unanswered or unsatisfactorily answered, this court will
grant MERS Motion for Protective Order as it relates to written discovery. Having so ruled, the
court denies ParkWest's Motion to Compel as it relates to written discovery. The court finds that
MERS has disclosed its entire file and has made the above representations that should satisfy the
concerns expressed by ParkWest.
As for the issue of the deposition, the court will grant ParkWest's Motion to Compel
MERS to identify and produce for deposition an IRCP 30(b)(6) designee. The court finds that
given the procedural history of this action and the status ofMERS at this junction of the case that
MERS will, in the interest of judicial economy and resolution, submit to a deposition. MERS
Motion for Protective Order as to the request to submit to a deposition is denied.
Finally, the court must address the matter as to where the deposition will take place.
MERS argues that it should not be forced to come to Idaho because the deponent is not located
here, the file is not located here, and because MERS has no interest in the subject property.
ParkWest argues that it should be allowed to bring the MERS deponent to Idaho because it
would reduce the expense for both sides.

Neither party has submitted authority from this
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jurisdiction as to the court's discretion, or lack thereof. MERS cites to O'Sullivan v. Rivera, 229
F.R.D. 187 (D.N.M. 2004) in which the United States District Court of New Mexico stated that
"An out-of-state deponent is under no obligation to travel to the location where the case was filed
for a deposition." Id, at 188. The court also stated that "[i]n the absence of exceptional or
unusual circumstances, when a deponent resides at a substantial distance from the deposing
party's residence, the deposing party should be required to take the deposition at a location in the
vicinity in which the deponent resides, even if the deponent is a party." Id, at 189 citing Metrex
Research Corp. v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 122 (D.Colo.1993).
ParkWest cites to Dagen v. CFC Group Holdings Ltd., 2003 WL 21910861
S.D.N.Y.2003 (unpublished opinion) for the idea that a court may overcome the "familiar
presumption in favor of locating a deposition at the deponent's residence or place of business"
when the plaintiff shows that "factors of cost, convenience, and litigation efficiency militate in
favor of' a different location." Id, at *3.
Recognizing that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) gIves this court discretion to
consider specific facts and circumstances regarding discovery practices and given the general
rule as to the location of a deposition of an out-of-state defendant, this court finds that if
ParkWest intends to pursue the deposition of MERS it shall do so in the location of the MERS
representative designated pursuant to IRCP 30(b)(6). The court finds that given MERS limited
remaining involvement in this action, MERS' representation that it has disclosed its entire file,
and the fact that the location of the file is not in Idaho are all factors weighing in favor of MERS
position at this time. This court recognizes that ParkWest may face expenses related to travel in
pursuing the deposition, however, ParkWest has other options available to it to minimize the
expenses related to conducting this deposition. The court does find merit in the position that
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financial institution doing busine.ss in this state should be prepared to make designated
representatives available for deposition in this state although their headquarters or records may
be located in another state. The court denies ParkWest's Motion to Compel MERS to bring its
IRCP 30(b)(6) deponent to Idaho and grants MERS' Motion for Protective Order as to the same
Issue.
Having so found, ParkWest's Motion to Compel is granted in part, and denied in part and
MERS' Motion for Protective Order is granted in part, and denied in part as set forth above.
However, the preceding rulings are most likely moot in light of the court's decision on the other
issues discussed in this memorandum decision.

MERS' Motion to Dismiss

At this time, MERS seeks dismissal from this action because it no longer holds any
interest in the subject property and is therefore, not a real party in interest from which ParkWest
may obtain relief. ParkWest objects to the dismissal because MERS has at all times heretofore
asserted a claim for priority over ParkWest's lien and without acknowledgement from MERS
that MERS does not intend to assert that claim in the future, ParkWest needs MERS to be
retained as a party to its action.
In the Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien filed on September 14,2010,
ParkWest alleges that MERS was the beneficiary under two deeds of trust encumbering the
subject property (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999
recorded November 14, 2006). (Supplemental Amended Complaint

~

3). ParkWest also alleges

that pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 45-506 and 45-512 that the MERS Deeds of Trust are junior in
priority to the liens filed by ParkWest. (Supplemental Amended Complaint

~

16).
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Thus,

ParkWest prayed for a determination that its lien had priority over the MERS Deeds of Trust and
that ParkWest should be allowed to foreclose its lien.
The following facts (as taken from the affidavits submitted in support and opposition of
this motion) are relevant to the court's determination as to whether or not MERS should be
allowed to be released from this action:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County Recorder on November 14,
2006 as Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999.
MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust.
Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust.
On June 28, 2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840).
On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's
Deed following a Trustee's Sale.
On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing
Residential to intervene as a party to this action.
On November 15,2010, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention in
this action.
While it is true that up until the time that Residential intervened in this action MERS

acted as if it maintained an interest in the property, the court cannot find that to be the case any
longer. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "Lien foreclosures under I.C. § 45-501 et seq. are
strictly actions in rem and are not in personam proceedings: 'The lien statute operates in rem,
and not in personam. It creates no personal charge against the owner of the property, but rather a
charge against the property to the extent of its value.' " Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter,
139 Idaho 846, 87 P.3d 955 (2004), citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 44, 539 P.2d 590, 596
(1975). In addition, Idaho Code § 45-1510 states that once a trustee's deed is recorded it
becomes prima facie evidence in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value or any successor
interest. Idaho Code § 45-1513 provides that a deed of trust or transfer of any interest in real
property in trust to secure the performance of any obligation shall be a conveyance of real
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property. Thus, once Residential became the owner of the property pursuant to the Trustee's
Deed, MERS' interest was extinguished. It is true that MERS continued to defend this action
throughout the appellate process but sought to have Residential joined as a party once the matter
was remanded to this court.
Additional support for MERS' position is found in the parties own agreements and
correspondence. The court notes that in the Stipulation to Intervene, filed on November 4, 2010,
the parties agreed that Residential acquired the property pursuant to the Trustee's Deed and is
now the record owner of the property.

The court also notes that Exhibits B and C to the

Affidavit of Ryan McFarland filed on January 5, 2011 contained emails and a proposed Partial
Judgment in which it is clear that ParkWest contemplates dismissal ofMERS if the court retains
jurisdiction over MERS discovery responses and a request for attorney fees.
In this case, ParkWest has asserted an interest, via its lien, in the subject property and
only against the property. However, ParkWest does not retain a cause of action against MERS,
which lost its interest in the property as a result of the execution and delivery of the Trustee's
Deed transferring the property to Residential. ParkWest appears to recognize that dismissal of
MERS may be appropriate but has articulated concerns about the procedural effect of dismissal
of MERS on their claims in this action.
The court concludes that MERS no longer retains an interest in the subject property
because that interest has been transferred to Residential via the Trustee's Deed as noted above.
MERS' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
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Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits on file show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity

Co., 126 Idaho 604, 606 (1995). At all times, the burden of proving the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact rests upon the moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119
Idaho 514,517 (1991).
In consideration of the motion, the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences
contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks,
119 Idaho 539, 541 (1991). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving
party's case must be anchored in something more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851
(Ct. App. 1986). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not merely rest on
the allegations contained in the pleadings; rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition
must be produced to contradict the assertions of the moving party. Ambrose v. Buhl School Dist.
#412, 126 Idaho 581 (Ct. App. 1995).
The existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, an on
which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1992). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. In such cases, there can be "no genuine issue of material fact," since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial. Id. citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323
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(1986). This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial.

Id.

Summary judgment dismissing a claim is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to submit evidence
to establish an essential element of the claim. Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 Idaho 199, 202
(1996).
As indicated above, Residential is the current owner of the property at issue in this case,
and the sole defendant remaining in the action. The following time line is relevant to the issues to
be considered by the court in these motions:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

On March 15, 2006, Park West contracted with Barnson to build a home on the property.
On May 18,2006, ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property.
On November 14, 2006, MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County
Recorder as Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999.
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust.
o Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust.
On November 28, 2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County
Recorder Inst. No. 200694511.
On June 28, 2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840).
On August 7, 2007, ParkWest filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien, naming
Bamson and MERS as defendants.
On August 13,2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst.
No. 2007055927. An amended lis pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as
Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007062387.
On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's
Deed following a Trustee's Sale.
On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing
Residential to intervene as a party to this action.
On November 15,2010, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention.
In its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention filed on November 15,2010, Residential

asserts a counterclaim against ParkWest and seeks a Declaratory Judgment that:

Residential took clean title to the Property via the Trustee's Deed, that
ParkWest's failure to name Transnation and First American as Defendants in this
action within six months of filing the Lien means that ParkWest's Lien is void as
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to Transnation, First American, and Residential under Idaho Code section 45-510,
and that ParkWest has no right, title or interest in the Property.
Counterclaim in Intervention 112
In its Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention, filed on November 30, 2010, ParkWest
asserts as an Affirmative Defense that:

Residential had actual and/or constructive notice of ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien
as of the date of the Trustee's Deed .... , Residential's interest in the property at
issue is subject to (a) the senior and superior rights of ParkWest in said property,
and (b) the "law of the case" established by the decision in ParkWest Homes LLC
v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), including all matters that were
embraced by the judgment from which the first appeal was taken but not raised in
that appeal.
Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention 1 5.
Residential seeks summary jUdgment on the grounds that ParkWest did not commence an
action against Residential (or its predecessor) within 6 months of filing the mechanic's lien as
required by I.C. 45-510. Residential asserts that it owns the property free and clear of the Lien
and ParkWest's claims against the property. The motion is supported by the Affidavit of Ryan
McFarland that provides the relevant documents detailing the status of the parties at issue in the
motion. ParkWest opposes the motion and argues both that Residential is bound by the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision as to the validity ofthe lien and that Residential is bound by the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision because it took ownership of the property after ParkWest filed a lis

pendens.
Residential has also filed a Motion in Limine seeking an order from the court regarding
the effect of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Barnson. Specifically, Residential argues
that the Idaho Supreme Court only addressed the issues of (1) validity of the lien and the
verification requirements; (2) validity of the lien and the Idaho Contractor's Registration Act;
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"

and (3) that the construction contract was void as an illegal contract. To that extent, Residential
argues that ParkWest must prove all other aspects of the validity of the lien. While the court
would not generally address such a motion in conjunction with the analysis on summary
judgment, the court finds that it must address the "law of the case" arguments propounded by
ParkWest for both motions and will do so below.

The "law of the case" and the Ramson decision

After Judge Petrie entered summary judgment in favor ofMERS, ParkWest appealed that
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed Judge Petrie's decision
and remanded the matter back to this court. In the decision issued as ParkWest Homes LLC v.
Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the following

Issues:

1) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claim of lien did not substantially
comply with I.C. 45-507?
2) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest's claimed lien was unenforceable
because the construction contract was void for failure to comply with the Contractor's
Act?
3) Did the district court err in holding that ParkWest did not plead a claim for unjust
enrichment?
4) Is MERS entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal?
In support of its position, ParkWest relies on the following two statements made by the
appellate court, "[w]e hold that the claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho Code § 45507 and that the lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after the contractor registered.,"
and "[t]hus, ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided and materials it supplied
during the time that it was duly registered." Id. ParkWest relies on these statements in order to
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demonstrate that the "law of the case" is that the lien at issue is valid and that the lien's validity
cannot be challenged after such a holding by the appellate court.
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives
LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 153 P.3d 1158 (2007), citing Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5

P.3d 973, 976 (2000). It has also been held that the law of the case may prevent consideration on
a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier
appeal. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009).
In this case, the court recognizes that it is bound by the determinations made by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Barnson, however, the court does not find that the decision in Barnson
controls all aspects of the remainder of this case. The court finds that the holdings in Barnson
must be considered within the context of the Idaho Supreme Court's overall ruling as to the
specific issues pending before it at the time that it issued the decision. As noted above, the court
addressed four specific issues on appeal directly related to the issues decided by Judge Petrie in
his summary judgment order.
At issue before Judge Petrie and the Idaho Supreme Court was the issue of whether the
ParkWest lien complied with Idaho Code 45-507(3) (relating to an amount claimed after
deduction of all just credits and offsets) and 45-507(4) (relating to the verification requirements).
Also at issue on appeal was the issue of whether ParkWest's failure to register pursuant to the
Idaho Contractors Registration Act completely invalidated the lien, and the Idaho Supreme Court
held that the lien was valid as to work completed after the contractor registered.
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To the extent that those aspects of the validity of the ParkWest lien were at issue in the
then pending motion for summary judgment, ParkWest is correct that this court could not make a
finding that differed from the Idaho Supreme Court's holding on those issues.

However,

nowhere in that appellate decision does the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that ParkWest's lien is
valid and enforceable and not challengeable as to all the other lien requirements found in Idaho
Code 45-501 et seq nor did the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that on remand that the district
court would be foreclosed from considering other aspects of the lien's validity not specifically
addressed by the Court in its appellate decision. It is true that the introduction to the appellate
decision indicates that the "claim oflien substantially complied with Idaho Code 45-507 and that
the lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after the contractor registered". When that
statement is considered in the context of the issues presented to the Idaho Supreme Court and the
court's overall decision on those issues, this court does not conclude that it is precluded from
addressing Residential's motion for summary judgment based on the requirement that all parties
in interest must be named in the Complaint filed within six months of the recording of the lien.
ParkWest also argues that Residential is foreclosed from raising other lien validity issues
because it did not raise those issues, specifically the issue of whether the lien is void as to
Residential, before the district court during the first motion for summary judgment or during the
appeal of Judge Petrie's decision. While it may be argued in some cases that the "law of the
case" doctrine should be so applied, this court does not conclude Residential or its predecessors
in interest could have raised the issue or were obligated to raise the issue in the prior proceedings
because those entities were not parties to this case at that time.
Thus, the court concludes that the Barnson appellate decision does not, as a matter of
law, preclude the consideration by this court of Residential's pending motion for summary
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judgment because the current issues raised by Residential were not, nor likely could have been,
raised either before Judge Petrie or during the appeal of his decision because neither Residential
nor its predecessor in interest were named parties to this action at the time Judge Petrie decided
the issues previously appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.
Consistent with this conclusion, this court grants Residential's motion in limine regarding
the "law of the case" to the extent that ParkWest may only rely on the Barnson appellate
decision as the "law of the case" to the extent that the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on the
elements of lien validity presented to it during that appeal and that all other aspects of lien
validity not raised before Judge Petrie or during the appeal of his decision remain issues to be
decided by this court.

The effect of ParkWest's failure to name Residential or its predecessor in interest as a
~

Residential seeks summary judgment on the grounds that ParkWest failed to comply with
Idaho Code 45-510 and thus, the lien is void as to ParkWest. Idaho Code 45-510 states "[n]o lien
provided for in this chapter binds any building .. .improvement or structure for a longer period
than six (6) months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper
court within that time to enforce such lien. I.C. 45-510.
This statute provides the court with jurisdiction to enforce a lien when certain conditions
are met, among those conditions being the commencement of the action to enforce the lien
within six months of the filing of the lien.

Palmer v. Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 388 P.2d 96

(1963). The court's jurisdiction is extinguished after that time period has passed because, it has
been held, that after that point, the lien no longer exists. Id. That is, failure to commence an
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action to foreclose a lien within the six-month period voids the lien, and the court is to treat it as
if it never existed.
It has also been held that the requirement to commence the action within six months

applies to all parties who hold an interest in the property. In Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298
P.2d 972 (1956), the Idaho Supreme Court found that the lienholder's failure to name the
wife/co-owner of the property as a party to the action invalidated the lien as to her interest in the
property. The court went on to find that because her interest could not be separated from her
husband's interest, then the right to foreclose the lien was lost entirely. Id. This doctrine was
recognized in Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 682
P.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1984) in which the Idaho Court of Appeals found that "our Supreme Court
had held that a lien foreclosure action must be commenced within six months against the persons
versus whose interests the lien is being asserted; otherwise the lien was lost as to those persons."
Id. In that case, the Court of Appeals addressed the language ofIdaho Code 45-1302 that states,
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property or a lien on
or security interest in personal property, the plaintiff, cross-complainant or
plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same cause of action,
any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, claiming or
appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any part of the
real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in addition to
granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or interest of all
parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as in the
action to quiet title.
Idaho Code 45-1302.
In addressing the potential conflict between I.C. 45-1302 and 45-510 in which it appears
that a plaintiff "may" name a potential defendant holding an interest in the property at issue in a
lien foreclosure action with the requirement that a lien foreclosure action must be commenced
within six months, the Court of Appeals held that "I.C. § 45-1302 does not enable a materialman
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to foreclose a lien as against other interested parties without gIvmg them notice of the
proceedings." Bonner, supra. They then held that while the plaintiff, Bonner, was not required
to name Standard as a party to the foreclosure action pursuant to I.C. 45-130, the "the failure to
do so left Standard's interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure." Id. The court went
on to find that "[because Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six months of the
filing of its claim of lien, it lost its lien against the property in regard to Standard. For the
purpose of the instant case, Bonner's lien was extinguished. Standard's interest in the property
should be confirmed by the district court, free of Bonner's lien." Id.
In this case, prior to Residential's intervention into the action, the only named defendants
in this action were Julie Bamson and MERS. ParkWest did not name as a defendant either
Transnation Title, the original trustee under the MERS deeds of trust, nor did it name First
American Title, who was the designated successor trustee to the MERS deeds of trust at the time
the Complaint was filed in August 2007. It is undisputed that the ParkWest lien was filed on
November 282006, and the action was filed on August 7, 2007. Thus, it is clear from the record
that ParkWest failed to name either Transnation or First American within the six month
limitation provided for by Idaho Code 45-510.
First American was the trustee pursuant to the MERS Deeds of Trust at the time the
Verified Complaint was filed in this case. Residential argues that First American was a necessary
party to this action because it was the Trustee ofthe Deed of Trust. Idaho Code 45-1502 defines
"trustee" as a person to whom legal title is conveyed by trust deed, and "trustee deed" is a deed
conveying real property to a trustee. A deed of trust is a conveyance of real property, and legal
title to the property is conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee. See I.e. 45-1513 and
Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222 (1999). Thus, Residential argues
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MERS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER, PARKWEST'S MOTION TO COMPEL, MERS' MOTION TO DISMISS,
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESIDENTIAL'S
MOTION IN LIMINE - 18

498

that the trustee is a necessary party because it is the party holding legal title to the property. This
argument is supported by 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics Liens 369 (2010) which states:
In a jurisdictions in which a deed of trust or mortgage is effective as a transfer of
legal title to the secured party, the trustee of a deed of trust recorded before
attachment of a mechanic's lien is a necessary party to a suit to enforce the
mechanic's lien; if the trustee is not a party to the enforcement suit, the mechanic's
lien cannot be enforced. Thus, the court in such a case must have jurisdiction over
the person of the trustee before the court can divest the trustee of title. The
beneficiary of a deed of trust that is inferior to the mechanic's lien is also a
necessary party in a title-theory jurisdiction, since such a beneficiary holds an
interest that may be defeated or diminished if the mechanic's lien is enforced.
52 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics Liens 369 (2010).

This court agrees with Residential assertion that First American, as the designated
successor trustee was a necessary party to this action because First American, as the trustee, held
the power of sale and the power to convey legal title in the property. ParkWest's failed to name
First American as a party defendant in this action or otherwise proceed against the trustee in its
action and thus, ParkWest's lien is not valid as to First American pursuant to I.C. 45-510 and the
authority cited above. Thus, when First American conveyed title to Residential via the Trustee's
Deed, Residential took title to the property free of the lien's encumbrance. As noted in Palmer,
the failure to commence an action pursuant to a lien within the six months results in the finding
that no lien existed at the time of the trustee's sale. ParkWest also argues that while it may be
precluded from foreclosing the lien as to Residential's interest in the property, that Residential
took the property subject to the lis pendens that had been recorded prior the time of the trustee's
sale.
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The effect of the lis pendens

ParkWest argues that because Residential acquired its interest after the lis pendens was
recorded, then Residential is bound by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Barnson,
ParkWest's argument rests on its "law of the case" arguments addressed above.

ParkWest

argues that that a party with notice of a lis pendens takes the property subject to the rights of the
parties in the action. See Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d
161 (Ct. App. 1989). See also 54 CJS Lis Pendens 46 (2005).
Idaho Code 5-505 provides the following with regards to the effect of a lis pendens:
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant at the time of filing
his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the
property or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action,
containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names.
I.C. 5-505 . (emphasis added).

This code section codifies the common law principle that "when a third party-with actual
or constructive notice of a pending action involving real property-acquires an interest in that real
property from a party to the action, then the third party takes subject to the rights ofthe parties in
the action as finally determined by the judgment or decree." Sartain v. Fidelity Financial
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d 161 (Ct. App.1989). Thus, when a subsequent purchaser
of the property has actual notice of a pending action affecting the property, it takes that property
subject to the pending action, however, if the party takes an interest in the affected property prior
to notice of the pending action, it is not bound by the subsequent judgment or decree unless it is
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made a party to the action. Id.
In this case, the court has found that the Barnson decision only dealt with the elements of
the validity of the lien specifically addressed in the decision and that all other aspects of lien
validity were unresolved. Thus, ParkWest's reliance on the law of the case with respect to the lis
pendens argument is misplaced and denied for the reasons discussed above.
In addition, the court finds that the plain language of I.C. 5-505 requires a lis pendens to
contain "the names of the parties" which in this case were, at the filing of the lis pendens,
Bamson and MERS.

See Memorandum in Opposition to Residential's Motion for Summary

Judgment filed December 27, 2010. Thus, neither Transnation nor First American were named
as a party to the action, nor were they listed as parties to the action in the lis pendens. Thus,
there would be no constructive or actual knowledge of the lien imputed to a purchaser of the
property who would be obtaining legal title to the property from the trustee, First American.
Therefore, the court finds that Residential should be granted the summary judgment that
it has requested because there was no valid lien encumbering the trustee's interest in the property
pursuant to I.C. 45-510 and First American was not a named party to the action when the
complaint was filed or within the mandated six month period of the filing of the lien and the lis
pendens failed to name Residential or its predecessors in interest, the trustees under the relevant
deeds of trust pursuant to I.e. 5-505.
In making this decision, the court has considered the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits offered in support and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and
finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Residential is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
For the reasons set forth above, Residential's motion for summary judgment is granted
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and ParkWest's claims against Residential are dismissed.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:
1.

Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's motion for summary judgment
filed November 17,2010 is granted and ParkWest Homes, LLC claims against
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC are dismissed.

2. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.'s motion to dismiss filed November
12,2010 is granted and ParkWest Homes, LLC's claims against Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. are dismissed.
3. Although rendered moot by the decisions to grant the motion to dismiss and for
summary judgment set forth above, MERS motion for a protective order,
Residential's motion in limine, and ParkWest's motion to compel the deposition of
the MERS representative are all granted to the extent set forth in this order.
4. The attorneys for the Defendants Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. shall submit proposed judgments in
compliance with IRCP 54(a) within ten days of this order. Any request for an award
of costs and attorney fees shall be submitted pursuant to applicable Idaho rule, statute
or precedent.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JiL

day of February, 2011, slhe served a true and correct
The undersigned certifies that on
copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner
described:
•

upon counsel for plaintiff,
Robert B. Burns
Moffatt, Thomas Barrett, Rock and Fields, Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701

•

upon counsel for defendants
Ryan T. McFarland
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis, and Hawley, LLP
877 West Main St., Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

•

upon counsel for Julie Bamson
David E. Wishney
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise, Idaho 83701-0837

and/or when s/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the u.S. Mail with sufficient
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

Chris Yamamoto, Clerk of the Court

By: ____~~~------------
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Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
Delaware limited liability company; and
DOES 1-10;

Case No. CV 07-8274
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF ORDER ON RESIDENTIAL'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; NOTICE OF HEARING
(April 7, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.)

Defendants,
and
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Defendant/Intervenor.
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PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest") hereby moves the Court pursuant to
LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) for reconsideration of its order, filed February 16, 2011, granting summary
judgment to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") and dismissing
ParkWest's claims against Residential.
This motion is based on the following grounds:
(a)

the entry of final judgment against Julie G. Bamson in ParkWest's favor

on October 7, 2008, which granted ParkWestjudgment for $141,208.39, together with
prejudgment interest and costs and attorney fees in the amounts therein specified, to the extent of
Bamson's interest in the residential property at issue in this lien foreclosure action (the
"Property") ;
(b)

the following facts set forth in this court's Memorandum Decision and

Order on MERS' Motion for Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to
Dismiss, Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine, filed
February 16,2011 ("Memorandum Decision"):
•
•
•

•

•
•

•

On March 15,2006, ParkWest contracted with Bamson to build a home on the property.
On May 18~ 2006. Park West commenced construction of improvements on the Property.
On- November 14, 2006, MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County
Recorder as lnst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999.
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust.
o Transnation Title was the 'Vfrustee" of the Deeds of Trust.
On November 28, 2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County
Recorder Inst. No. 200694511.
On June 28, 2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder lost. No. 2007044840).
On August 7, 2007, ParkWest flled its Verified Complaint t'? Foreclose Lien, naming
Bamson and MERS as defendants.
On August 13,2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst.
No. 2007055927. An amended /is pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as
Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007062387.
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•
•
•

On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's
.
Deed following a Trustee ts Sale.
On November 10. 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing
Residential to intervene as a party to this action.
On November 15. 20 10, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention.

Memorandum Decision 11; and
(c)

Application to the foregoing judgment and stated facts of the holdings in

First National Bank o/Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900) (judgment establishing
interest in real property constitutes a judgment lien in the property from the date of entry of the
judgment), and Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) (because "a deed of trust
is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale[,]" a conveyance oflegal title by
the trustee is subject to legal and equitable interests in the property obtained prior to the date of
the trustee's deed through the owner ofthe property/grantor of the deed oftrust).
ParkWest desires to file a brief with the court in support of this motion within 14
days and to present oral argument in support of this motion.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ParkWest will call up for hearing the foregoing
motion before the Honorable Bradly S. Ford, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho,
on Thursday, April 7, 2011, at the hour of9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be
heard.
DATED this 22nd day of February 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of February 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON
RESIDENTIAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; NOTICE OF HEARING to
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

877 W. Main St., Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Facsimile (208) 954-5223 and (208) 954-5236

~L~~
Robert B. Bu s
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited )
liability company,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
JULIE G. BARNS ON, an unmarried woman; )
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
)
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
)
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
)
Homecomings Financial, LLC (flkla
)
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
)
Delaware limited liability company; and
)
DOES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants
)
and
)
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE )
)
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
)
liability company,
)
)
DefendantiCounterclaimant.
)

Case No. CV 07-8274
JUDGMENT

Based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision And Order On MERS' Motion For
Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion To Compel, MERS' Motion To Dismiss, Residential's
Motion For Summary Judgment, And Residential's Motion In Limine entered in this matter on
February 16, 2011;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADmDGED, AND DECREED that final judgment is
awarded in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for
Homecomings Financial, LLC (flkla Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) ("MERS") and
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), and against PlaintiffParkWest
Homes LLC ("ParkWest") as follows:

JUDGMENT-I
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1.

This above-captioned case, and all claims asserted therein, are, as to MERS,

dismissed with prejudice in their entirety;
2.

With respect to the real property at issue in this lawsuit (the "Property"), the

interest of Residential is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's interest, including,
without limitation, ParkWest's mechanic's lien (the "Lien") that is at issue in this abovecaptioned action;
3.

ParkWest's Lien was foreclosed by the trustee's sale pursuant to which

Residential took title to the Property, and ParkWest's Lien is extinguished by said trustee's sale
for all purposes and no longer constitutes a lien on the Property;
4.

All claims asserted by ParkWest against the Property and Residential are

dismissed with prejUdice in their entirety;
5.

This Judgment, along with the Judgment entered against Juli Barnson on October

7,2008, constitutes a final judgment as to all parties and all claims asserted in this action;
6.

This Court may amend or supplement this judgment at the appropriate time for

the entry of any ruling on costs and attorneys' fees as appropriate and the Court shall retain
jurisdiction over this case for ~urposes.
DATED THIS

~ day of February, 2011.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Robert B. Bums
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

,..--v.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy

r- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

David E. Wishney
Attorney at Law
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701-0837
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Barnson]

Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy

Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

------U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 07-8274
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT; NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.
(April 7, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.)

JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
Homecomings Financial, LLC (flkla
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
Delaware limited liability company; and
DOES 1-10;
Defendants,
and
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Defendant/Intervenor.
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Plaintiff ParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest") hereby moves the Court pursuant to
LR.C.P. 59(e) to alter or amend the Judgment entered in favor of Residential Funding Real
Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") and dismissing ParkWest's lien in the property at issue,
filed March 1,2011 (the "Judgment").
This motion is being filed to protect the district court's jurisdiction to alter or
amend the Judgment after hearing ParkWest's pending Motion for Reconsideration of Order on
Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 23,2011, and is based on the
identical grounds for that motion, as follows:
(a)

the entry of final judgment against Julie G. Bamson in ParkWest's favor

on October 7,2008, which granted ParkWestjudgment for $141,208.39, together with
prejudgment interest and costs and attorney fees in the amounts therein specified, to the extent of
Bamson's interest in the residential property at issue in this lien foreclosure action (the
"Property") ;

(b)

the following facts set forth in this court's Memorandum Decision and

Order on MERS' Motion for Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to
Dismiss, Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine, filed
February 16, 2011 ("Memorandum Decision"):

•
•
•

On March 15,2006. Park West contracted with Barnson to build a home on the property.
On May 18,2006, ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property.
On-November 14, 2006, MERS recOided two deeds of trust with the Canyon County
Recorder as Inst. No. 200690998 and Inst. No. 200690999.
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust.
o Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust.
• On November 28, 2006~ ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County
Recorder Inst. No. 200694511.
• On June 28.2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of
the First Deed of Trust (Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840).
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On August 7, 2007, ParkWest fi.Ied its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien, naming
Barnson and MERS as defendants.
• On August 13. 2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst
No. 2007055927. An amended lis pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as
Canyon County Recorder lnst No. 2007062387.
• On July 20,2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's
Deed following a Trustee's Sale.
• On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing
Residential to intervene as a party to this action.
• On November 15,2010, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention.
•

Memorandum Decision 11; and
(c)

Application to the foregoing judgment and stated facts of the holdings in

First National Bank o/Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900) (judgment establishing
interest in real property constitutes a judgment lien in the property from the date of entry of the
judgment), and Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) (because "a deed of trust
is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale[,]" a conveyance of legal title by
the trustee is subject to legal and equitable interests in the property obtained prior to the date of
the trustee's deed through the owner of the property/grantor of the deed of trust).
ParkWest desires to file a brief with the court in support of this motion within 14
days and to present oral argument in support of this motion.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ParkWest will call up for hearing the foregoing
motion before the Honorable Bradly S. Ford, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho,
on Thursday, April 7, 2011, at the hour of9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be
heard.
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DATED this 3rd day of March 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of March 2011, I caused a true and
conect copy ofthe foregoing MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT; NOTICE
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Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland
& HA WLEY LLP
877 W. Main St., Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617
Facsimile (208) 954-5223 and (208) 954-5236
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited
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MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
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Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
Delaware limited liability company; and
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The stated basis for the Court granting summary judgment to Defendant
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") against PlaintiffParkWest
Homes LLC ("ParkWest") is as follows:
ParkWest's [sic] failed to name [trustee] First American as a party
defendant in this action or otherwise proceed against the trustee in
its action and thus, ParkWest's lien is not valid as to First
American pursuant to I.e. 45-510 and the authority cited above.
Thus, when First American conveyed title to Residential via the
Trustee's Deed, Residential took title to the property free of the
lien's encumbrance. As noted in Palmer, the failure to commence
an action pursuant to a lien within the six months results in the
finding that no lien existed at the time of the trustee's sale.
Memorandum Decision and Order ("Memorandum Decision"), filed February 16, 2011, p. 19
(underscoring added). And based on the foregoing ruling, the Court entered Judgment, filed
March 1, 2011, that "[ w ]ith respect to the real property at issue in this lawsuit (the 'Property'),
the interest of Residential is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's interest, including,
without limitation, ParkWest's mechanic's lien (the 'Lien') that is at issue in this abovecaptioned action .... " Judgment' 2.
The Court has thus expressly held that ParkWest's mechanic's lien was invalid
against First American and Residential. However, not addressed in either party's briefing to the
Court, nor therefore by the Court in its Memorandum Decision, was the fact and effect of the
final judgment that was previously entered in this lawsuit against Defendant Julie G. Bamson
("Bamson"), who was then the owner ofthe Property. Accordingly, based on the points and
authorities discussed below, ParkWest requests the Court to reconsider its Memorandum
Decision and then alter and amend the Judgment to provide that Residential's interest in the
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Property is subject to thejudgment lien of ParkWest, to the extent of Bamson's interest in the
Property at the time that final judgment was entered against her.

II.

FACTS

Both of ParkWest's pending motions are based on the following grounds:
(a)

the entry of final judgment against Bamson in ParkWest's favor on

October 7, 2008 (the "Bamson Judgment"), which granted ParkWestjudgment for $141,208.39,
together with prejudgment interest and costs and attorney fees in the amounts therein specified,
to the extent of Barnson's interest in the Property;} and

(b)

the following facts set forth in the Memorandum Decision:

On March 15,2006, ParkWest contracted with Barnson to build a home on the property.
On May 18,2006, ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property.
On-November 14, 2006, MERS recorded two deeds of trust with the Canyon County
Recorder as lnst No. 200690998 and Insf. No. 200690999.
o MERS was the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust.
o Transnation Title was the "Trustee" of the Deeds of Trust.
• On November 28. 2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the property as Canyon County
Recorder Jnst. No. 200694511.
• On Jooe 28,2007, First American title Insurance Company was appointed the trustee of
the First Deed of Trust (canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007044840).
• On August 7. 2007. ParkWest filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien, naming
Bamson and MERS as defendants.
• On August 13.2007, ParkWest recorded a lis pendens as Canyon County Recorder Inst
No. 2007055927. An amended lis pendens was recorded on September 13, 2007 as
Canyon County Recorder Inst. No. 2007062387.
•
•
•

} The following facts and rule of civil procedure establish that the Bamson Judgment
constituted a final judgment under Idaho law not later than January 26, 2009 - a date six months
prior to Residential's acquisition of the Property: (a) the express terms of the Bamson Judgment
("This Judgment shall be considered to be a final judgment against Bamson and is intended to
constitute the final judgment against her in this action."), Bamson Judgment ~ 4; (b) the
Judgment entered in this action by Judge Petrie on January 26,2009, with respect to all parties
other than Bamson; and (c) I.R.C.P. 54(a) ("A judgment is final if ... judgment has been entered
on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.").
Additionally, of course, the Judgment here at issue also provides that the Bamson Judgment is a
final judgment. Judgment ~ 5.
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•
•
•

On July 20, 2009, First American conveyed the property to Residential via a Trustee's
Deed following a Trustee's Sale.
On November 10, 2010, the Order on Stipulation to Intervene was granted allowing
Residential to intervene as a party to this action.
On November 15, 20 10, Residential filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention.

Memorandum Decision 11.

III.

ARGUMENT

As pled by ParkWest in its Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien
("Supplemental Complaint"), filed September 14, 2010:
11.
Final judgment was entered in this action against
Barnson to the extent of her interest in the Property, but not
personally, pursuant to the terms ofthat certain Default Judgment
Against Julie G. Bamson Only, filed October 7, 2008, whereunder
ParkWest was awarded $141,208.39 for the amount owed to
ParkWest as of November 28, 2006, with respect to its
construction of improvements to the Property; prejudgment interest
at the rate of$69.64 per diem from November 28,2006, through
October 7,2008, which totals $47,285.56 in interest; and
$33,000.00 for the costs of perfecting and enforcing ParkWest's
lien, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney fees.
Supplemental Complaint ~ 11. Both the fact and effect of the Bamson Judgment were thereby
put squarely at issue in this lawsuit.
Some of the distinctions between judgment liens and mechanic's liens were
recently summarized by the Supreme Court of Connecticut:
A judgment lien is based on a judicial determination of the amount
of the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor and can be
independently verified by checking judicial records. A mechanic's
lien, on the other hand, is based on a contractor's representation of
the amount owed and cannot be independently verified.

PNC Bank, NA. v. Kelepecz, 960 A.2d 563,569 (Conn. 2008). Additionally, the very statute
upon which the Court's holding was based, Idaho Code Section 45-510, further distinguishes
between the two types of liens by providing a six-month period for the filing of suit to enforce a
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mechanic's lien and a five-year duration for "[t]he lien of a final judgment obtained on any lien
provided for in this chapter .... " I.e. § 45-510. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that
ParkWest both pled and claims a mechanic's lien in the Property vis-a-vis Defendant Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"),2 ParkWest also both pled and claims a
judgment lien in the Property based on the Bamson Judgment ("ParkWest's Judgment Lien").
The Supreme Court of Idaho first held over 100 years ago that a judgment lien on
real property attaches when judgment is entered by the court. This determination was more
recently confirmed by our Court of Appeals and affirmed by our Supreme Court in Fulton v.
Duro, 107 Idaho 240,687 P.2d 1367, afl'd, 108 Idaho 392,700 P.2d 14 (1985). As explained in
Fulton:
The effect of a judgment lien on real property, which
property is subsequently conveyed by the judgment debtor, has
been settled in Idaho since the tum of the century. In First
National Bank ofLewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900),
the bank, purchaser of real property at a sheriff s sale, sought
possession of the property from Hays, the grantee of the judgment
debtor, Morrison. In upholding the right of the bank to the
property, our Supreme Court said:
[A]s said judgment was of record in the records of the
district court of Nez Perces [sic] county, it was a lien upon
said land at the date said judgment debtor, Morrison,
conveyed said land to [Hays], and [Morrison] could not
divest it of said lien by a conveyance thereof to [the Hays].
Morrison was a party to the action in which said judgment
was rendered, and his grantees got no greater interest in
said land than he had at the date of his conveyance to
them .. " The judgment became a lien on said land on the
date of its entry, March 9, 1894; and the sheriffs deed by
relation dated back to the date when the lien ofsaid
judgment attached to said land, and cut off all subsequent
liens. As Morrison was defendant and judgment debtor in
2 Residential intervened as a defendant after the Supplemental Complaint was filed.
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said suit, and as the [Hays] claim title under conveyance
from him made subsequent to the entry of said judgment
and subsequent to the time that said judgment became a
lien upon said land, they are privies to said judgment, and
are as conclusively bound thereby, so far as the title to said
land is concerned, as Morrison himself....
Id. at 141-42,61 P. at 288.
Fulton, 107 Idaho at 245-46,687 P.2d at 1372-73 (emphasis added; brackets and concluding

ellipsis in original).
The grounds establishing that Residential acquired the Property subject to
ParkWest's Judgment Lien are discussed below.

A.

ParkWest's Judgment Lien Relates Back to the Date ParkWest Commenced
Construction of Improvements on the Property.
As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the doctrine of relation back

"merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the judgment lien back to the date of
attachment .... " United States v. Sec. Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950). Accord First
Mid-Illinois Bank & Trust, NA. v. Parker, 933 N.E.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010);
People's Bank v. Bilmor Bldg. Corp., 614 A.2d 456, 464 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992). Further, "[i]n

general, a judgment lien against real estate relates back to the date on which the real estate was
attached." BNC Mortgage, Inc. v. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(footnote with citations to multiple supporting authorities omitted). And consistent with the
foregoing authorities, it is held that "[t]he lien of judgment for a mechanic's lien relates back to
the time that the contractor commenced work or first supplied material." J.I Kislak Mortgage
Corp. o/Delaware v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
Accord In re Rainbow Trust, Bus. Trust, 200 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996), aff'd, 216 B.R.

77 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997). See also Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, No. 36523,2010
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WL 5186706, at *8 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2010) (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the time that work is
commenced under a contract ... ").
In the present dispute this Court expressly found that "[o]n May 18, 2006,
ParkWest commenced construction of improvements on the Property." Memorandum
Decision 11. Thus, by application of the doctrine of relation back, ParkWest's Judgment Lien
relates back to, and is effective as of, May 18, 2006 - a date six months before MERS recorded
its two deeds of trust against the Property. Id.

B.

Residential Acquired the Property Subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien.
As this Court explained: "A deed of trust is a conveyance ofreal property, and

legal title to the property is conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee." Memorandum
Decision 18 (citing I.e. § 45-1513 and Defendant A. v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d
222 (1999)). However, an issue not addressed in the Memorandum Decision is whether the
interest in property a trustee under a deed oftrust can convey is subject to divestiture as a result
of subsequent legal proceedings involving the grantor of the deed of trust. Our Supreme Court
held in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585,671 P.2d 1048 (1983), that it is.
In Long, Defendant Williams granted a deed of trust on land he owned to secure
payment under a promissory note to Avco, designating Lewis County Abstract Company as the
trustee. 105 Idaho at 586, 671 P.2d at 1049. A little more than a year after the deed of trust was
recorded, Williams filed bankruptcy, resulting in his interest in the property passing to the
bankruptcy estate. Id. The bankruptcy trustee then sold to Avco all of the bankruptcy estate's
interest in the property, following which Avco caused Lewis County Abstract Company to
reconvey its interest in the property to Williams. Id. A few months later, Plaintiff Long acquired
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Avco's interest in the property by quitclaim deed and then filed suit to evict Williams from the
property. !d.
In response to Long's suit, Williams contended that he remained the owner of the
property, arguing that Lewis County Abstract Company had legal title to the property by virtue
of the deed of trust at the time Williams filed bankruptcy, that therefore the bankruptcy trustee
could not convey legal title to Avco, and that the deed of reconveyance by Lewis County
Abstract Company effected the conveyance of all equitable and legal interests in the property
back to Williams. 105 Idaho at 587, 671 P.2d at 1050. Thus, just as in the present dispute, the
issue in Long was "whether a deed of trust conveys all legal title to the trustee, or whether the
passage oftitle to the trustee is, for practical purposes, in the nature of a mortgage with a power
of sale." Id.
The Supreme Court determined that Long, and not Williams (as the grantee under
the trustee's deed), was the owner of the property:
Therefore, we hold that, even though title passes for the purpose of
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage
with power of sale.
At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy, he
had a legal interest in the property which was good against all
persons except the Lewis County Abstract Company, which held
nothing more than the power of sale upon the happening of certain
contingencies. Williams' interest (comprised of all other attributes
of ownership) passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Section 541 of
Title 11 U.S.c. provides:
"Property of the estate. ( a) The commencement of a case
under section 301,302, or 303 ofthis title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located: (1) ... all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case."
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The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable
interests of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's
interest as beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this
purchased interest. Thus, Avco was the owner of the property and
entitled to possession ....
105 Idaho at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51. 3
The foregoing holding in Long determines that Residential acquired the Property
subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien for two reasons.
First, Long categorically establishes that the interest in property a trustee under a
deed of trust can convey is subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings
involving the grantor of the deed of trust. Accordingly, when the Barnson Judgment was entered
in this action, the interest in the Property First American could convey to Residential was
divested to the extent of ParkWest's Judgment Lien.
Second, Long also categorically establishes that the grantor of a deed of trust
retains all attributes of ownership with respect to the property conveyed under the deed of trust
other than the power of sale granted the trustee. Accordingly, Residential necessarily acquired
all attributes of ownership with respect to the Property (other than the power of sale) through
Barnson. And because these attributes of ownership were acquired through Bamson, Residential
3

Accord Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991):
Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to
the property in the trustee. Under Idaho law, a deed oftrust is a
mortgage with a power of sale; the legal title is conveyed to the
trustee solely for the purpose of security. The deed of trust leaves
in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to possession
of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the
grantor's default on the underlying obligation. See Long v.
Williams . ...

121 Idaho at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
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had constructive notice of the Bamson Judgment and ParkWest's Judgment Lien when
Residential purchased the Property, by reason of ParkWest's two lis pendens recorded against
the Property some two years prior to Residential's purchase. Memorandum Decision 11.
IV.

CONCLUSION

ParkWest submits that the just resolution of both ParkWest's claimed mechanic's
lien and judgment lien in the Property requires due consideration of the legal principles
established by the opinion in Long v. Williams. Yet neither Long nor Willis v. Realty Country,
Inc. was even mentioned in the Memorandum Decision. Accordingly, ParkWest respectfully

requests the Court to reconsider the Memorandum Decision based on the points and authorities
set forth above and then alter and amend the judgment to provide that Residential's interest in the
Property is subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien, to the extent of Bamson's interest in the
Property at the time that final judgment was entered against her.
DATED this 4th day of March 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT

DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 1

527

05000.0047.2284310.1

Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), by and
through its counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully files this
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration and Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment
(collectively, "Motions").
I.
INTRODUCTION

ParkWest Homes, LLC's ("ParkWest") latest Motions are refuted by the plain language
of Idaho statute, by Idaho case law applying Idaho's statutory framework for priority interests in
property, and by the very cases ParkWest relies upon. It is contrary to the plain language of
statute for ParkWest to try to bootstrap the priority of its judgment lien (against Bamson) into its
alleged mechanic's lien priority date. Under ParkWest's argument, a lien claimant could
establish its priority by colluding with just one person with an interest in the property, obtaining
a judgment against that person, and then asserting that judgment as binding against all other
persons with an interest in the subject property. By making this argument, ParkWest is asking
this Court to set aside an entire body of case and statutory law, and to invite collusion and fraud
by every single owner in the State of Idaho whose property is encumbered by a mortgage or deed
of trust. ParkWest's argument should be rejected.

II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
1.

On March 15,2006, ParkWest illegally contracted with Julie Bamson

("Barnson") to build a home on the property at issue in this case (the "Property"). See
Plaintiff's Supplemental Amended Complaint To Foreclose Lien filed in this action (the
"Amended Complaint"), 1 6. All of the construction costs were paid by construction loan funds
procured by Bamson; ParkWest received over $60,000 in income from those funds.
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2.

On November 14, 2006, Barnson repaid the construction loan by obtaining a loan

from Homecomings Financial, LLC ("Homecomings") secured by two Deeds of Trust
(collectively, the "MERS Deeds of Trust") recorded against the Property. Affidavit Of Ryan T.
McFarland In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion For
Summary Judgment ("McFarland Aff."), filed in this action on November 17, 2010,

~

2, Exh. A.

MERS was the beneficiary, and Transnation Title ("Transnation") was the "Trustee" under the
MERS Deeds of Trust. McFarland Aff.,
3.

~

2, Exh. A.

On November 28,2006, ParkWest recorded its mechanic's lien (the "Lien")

against the Property. The Lien rendered the Property valueless as to Barnson and Homecomings:
Barnson never resided a day at the Property, never received a dollar of rent from the Property,
and was never able to sell the Property; instead, Bamson incurred a $379,800 liability to
Homecomings and was forced to file bankruptcy. Homecomings, who was not a party to the
illegal contract, never received a single payment on its loans but has instead incurred three and
one-half years (so far) of costs and attorneys' fees in this Court, the United States Bankruptcy
Court, and the Idaho Supreme Court.
4.

On June 28, 2007, First American Title Insurance Company ("First American")

was appointed the Trustee of the First MERS Deed of Trust. McFarland Aff., ~ 3, Exh. B.
5.

On August 7, 2007, ParkWest initiated this lawsuit, naming only Barnson and

MERS as Defendants. ParkWest never named Transnation or First American as a defendant.
6.

On or about September 30,2008, ParkWest and Barnson filed a Stipulation For

Entry Of Default Judgment (the "StipUlation") which permitted ParkWest to take "immediate
possession of the Property;" in exchange, ParkWest agreed to "waive and release[] Bamson from
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any personal liability related to or arising out of ParkWest' s improvement of the Property."
Neither MERS nor Residential was a party to the Stipulation.
7.

On October 7,2008, pursuant to the Stipulation, this Court entered the Default

Judgment Against Julie G. Bamson Only (the "Bamson Judgment").
8.

On October 9, 2008, ParkWest recorded the Bamson Judgment in the official

records of Canyon County, Idaho. Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland filed concurrently herewith,
~

2, Exh. A.
9.

On July 9,2009, Homecomings foreclosed on the first MERS Deed of Trust and

First American conveyed the Property to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC
("Residential") via Trustee's Deed. McFarland Aff.,
10.

~

4, Exh. C.

MERS, Residential, and ParkWest stipulated to Residential's intervention in this

case on November 4, 2010. Second McFarland Aff., ~ 7, Exh. F.
11.

Residential filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code section

45-510, based on ParkWest's failure to name First American as a party defendant.
12.

On February 16, 2011, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision And Order

(the "Memorandum :pecision"), unequivocally granting Residential's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
13.

On March 1,2011, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Residential that

Residential's interest "is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's interest."
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III.
ARGUMENT

A.

This Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was Correctly Granted And Is Founded
On Deeply-Rooted Idaho Law.
The Court granted Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the

straightforward application ofIdaho law. Idaho Code section 45-510 provides that a mechanic's
lien becomes void six months after it is filed unless "proceedings be commenced in a proper
court within that time to enforce such lien." There is ample Idaho case law strictly construing
that six-month deadline. See Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 P.2d 972 (1956) (holding that
a mechanic's lien is lost as to a property owner not timely named in a suit, even where the
husband, a co-owner, is named in the lawsuit, because the six month time frame in which to
foreclose a lien "is more than a mere statute of limitations which is waived if not pleaded; ... it
is a limitation ... upon the right or liability itself; and ... the lien is lost as against the interest of
any person not made a party to an action to enforce it within the six month period"); Palmer v.
Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 401,388 P.2d 96 (1963) (holding that ifIdaho Code section 45-510 is

not complied with "no jurisdiction exists in the court to enforce the lien. When the limit fixed by
statute for duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any more than ifit had never been created");
Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497, 501, 185 P. 554 (1919);
D. W Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1915);
Continental & Commercial Trust v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915); and
Utah Implement-Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 942, 947-48 (D. Idaho 19l3). See also
Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners' Ass 'n, Inc. v. City ofKetchum, 127 Idaho 1, 2-3, 896 P.2d

327,328-29 (1995) (holding that the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over elected city
officials where the plaintiffs "failed to name the elected officials individually"); and Collier
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Carbon & Chemical Corp. v. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 Idaho 708, 710, 710 P.2d 618, 620 (Ct. App.

1985) (holding that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction initially to enter ... judgment" against
persons who were not named as defendants in their individual capacity in the complaint).
Because under Idaho Code sections 45-1202 and 45-1513 a deed of trust is a conveyance
of legal title to the trustee ofthe deed oftrust, the failure to name the trustee as a party defendant
is fatal to a lien claimant's foreclosure action This is the universally recognized rule of law. See
52 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 369 (2010). See also Heyward & Lee Construction Co.,
Inc., v. Sands, Anderson, l11arks, & Miller, 249 Va. 54,58,453 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1995); Walt
Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986); Riley v. Peters, 194

Cal.App.2d 296, 15 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W.Va. 458, 63 S.E.
308,311 (1908); Johnson v. Bennett, 6 Colo.App. 362,367,40 P. 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1895);
Schillinger Fire-Proof Cement & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 14 N.Y.S. 326, 329 (N.Y. Spec. Term
1891); and Columbia Building & Loan Ass 'no

Finally, Bonner Building Supply, Inc.

V.

V.

Taylor, 25 I1l.App. 429 (1887).

Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682,

682 P.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1984) stands for the rule that while naming parties to a lien foreclosure
action is optional, the upshot is that the interest of any unnamed party in the foreclosed property
is "unaffected by the foreclosure," and the lien is "lost ... against the property in regard to" such
unnamed parties. By application of this extensive and universal body oflaw, this Court correctly
found that ParkWest's failure to name First American was fatal to ParkWest's Lien, as against
First American and Residential: First American exercised its power of sale under the first MERS
Deed of Trust and conveyed the Property, free and clear of ParkWest's Lien, to Residential.

B.

ParkWest's Interest In The Property Pursuant To The Barnson Judgment Was
Never Senior To First American's Interest, And Was Eliminated By The Trustee's
Sale To Residential.
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In arguing for a reversal of the Judgment entered by this Court, ParkWest makes no effort
to address the comprehensive body oflaw supporting the Court's decision, nor does ParkWest
attempt to offer new evidence in support of its argument. Instead, ParkWest cavalierly
disregards Idaho statute by arguing that ParkWest 's Judgment Lien relates back to, and is
effective as of the date ParkWest allegedly began work on the property, prior to the date of the
recording of the MERS Deeds of Trust. This argument is contrary to Idaho Code section 10-

1110, which states:
A transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of
this state ... certified by the clerk having custody thereof, may be
recorded 'IV ith the recorder of any county of this state, who shall
immediately record and docket the same as by law provided, and
from the time of such recordi11g, and not before, the judgment so
recorded becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment
debtor in the county
(emphasis added). Judgment liens are creatures of statute: absent this statute, ParkWest would
not have had ajudgment lien at all, and the plain reading of the statute makes that lien effective
only from the time of the recording of the judgment lien and not before. The MERS Deeds of
Trust were recorded November 14,2006. The Bamson Judgment was entered October 7, 2008,
and was recorded October 9,2008, nearly two years after the MERS Deeds of Trust. By the
plain language of Idaho Code section 10-1110, "ParkWest's Judgment Lien" canl10t relate back
to when ParkWest allegedly started work on the Property and is not prior to the MERS Deeds of
Trust.
Idaho's recording laws also reject ParkWest's position. Idaho Code section 55-606
provides that
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is
conclusive against the grantor, also against everyone subsequently
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in
DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 7

533

05000.0047.2284310.1

good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded.
(emphasis added). The statute clearly makes judgment liens subject to the traditional recording
laws: judgment liens, like other conveyances (under Idaho Code section 45-1513, a deed of trust
is expressly defined as a "conveyance ofreal property"), have priority only as of the date they
are recorded. It follows that a judgment takes priority over a conveyance only when the
judgment has been entered by the Court and then recorded in the real property records prior to
the conveyance. First Nat. Bank of Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P. 287 (1900). A
judgment lien is eliminated as to particular property, therefore, by the foreclosure of a
previously-recorded (i.e., senior) mortgage or deed of trust. Credit Bureau ofPreston v. Sleight,
92 Idaho 210, 440 P.2d 143 (1968).
The case law cited by ParkWest - even the precise language quoted by ParkWest

stands

for the proposition that a judgment lien is effective only as of the date it is recorded:
•

Parkwest cites Fulton v. Duro, 107 Idaho 240,687 P.2d 1367 (Ct. App. 1984) for

the Court of Appeals' treatment of Hays. In the language quoted by ParkWest, the Court in Hays
held, and Fulton confirmed, that with respect to judgment liens:

Thejudgmel1t [becomes] a lien 011 said land 011 the date of its
entry . .. and the sheriff s deed [produced in connection with the
foreclosure of the judgment lien] by relation dated back to the date
when the lien of said judgment attached to said land, and cut off all
subsequent liens.
Fulton, 687 P.2d at 1373 (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language quoted by ParkWest
establishes that the Bamson Judgment became a lien only as of the date of its entry, not before.
•

ParkWest's citation to PNC Bank v. Kelepecz, 289 Conn. 692,960 A.2d 563

(2008) clarifies that a judgment lien does not take priority over a previously-recorded
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encumbrance. The owner of the property at issue, and eventual judgment debtor, executed a
mortgage against the property which was recorded in 1987; in 1992, the plaintiff obtained a
judgment against the property owner and recorded that judgment as a lien in 1992; then in 1996,
the property owner recorded two additional mortgages against the property. Id., 960 A.2d at 565.
Thereafter, "the trial court determined that the [1986] mortgage was first in priority on the
property .... It further concluded that [the] judgment lien was second in priority.... The trial
court further determined that [the first-recorded 1996] mortgage was third in priority." Id., at
566. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's findings. !d. at 573.
Also relevant to this instant case was the Connecticut court's note that "the right to file a
valid judgment lien is wholly a creature of the statute. The conditions precedent to the validity
of such a lien are all prescribed by statute." !d., at 568. So it is in Idaho: under Idaho Code
section 10-1110, a judgment constitutes a lien on real property only "from the time of such
recording, and not before."
•

ParkWest's citation to United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank a/San

Diego, 71 S.Ct. 111,340 U.S. 47 (1950) is similarly unavailing. In that case, the judgment

debtor had mortgages recorded against his property, a later federal tax lien recorded in 1946, and
ajudgment lien recorded in 1947. The Supreme Court ruled that the mortgages were entitled to
first priority, the federal tax lien to secondary priority, and the last-recorded judgment lien was
relegated to the most junior priority position. Id. Similarly here, ParkWest'sjudgment lien does
not take priority over the previously-recorded MERS Deeds of Trust.
•

ParkWest's citation to First Mid-Illinois Bank & Trust v. Parker, 403 Ill.App.3d

784, 933 N.E.2d 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) is inapplicable because it involves the priorities of
competing judgment creditors. Perhaps the only lesson to be drawn from that case is the Illinois
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Court's recognition ofthe principal that "generally, a lien that is first in time has priority and is
entitled to prior satisfaction out of the property it binds." So here: the MERS Deeds of Trust
were first in time vis-a.-vis, and so have priority over, ParkWest's Bamson Judgment lien.

•

People's Bankv. Bilmor Building Corp., 28 Conn.App. 809,614 A.2d 456 (Conn.

App. Ct. 1992), cited by ParkWest, is also inapplicable: it involves a mortgage (recorded in
1989), a pre-judgment writ of attachment (recorded in 1991), and a subsequent judgment lien.

Id. Pursuant to strict statutory interpretation, the Connecticut court held that the judgment lien
related back to the date of the pre-judgment writ of attachment; however, the Court did not find
that the pre-judgment writ of attachment was prior to the earlier-recorded mortgage. That case
has no bearing on this case: ParkWest did not file a pre-judgment writ of attachment under
Idaho Code section 8-501, et seq., and ParkWest has not offered this Court any case or statute
supporting the argument that a mechanic's lien should be treated as a pre-judgment writ of
attachment.
Idaho law expressly rejects the idea that prejudgment writs of attachments may issue in
cases where a mechanic's lien secures an alleged debt: in Heinrich v. Barlow, 87 Idaho 72, 390
P .2d 831 (1964), plaintiff, "[u ]pon the filing of the complaint ... filed his affidavit for [prejudgment] attachment, stating in substance that the defendants ... were indebted to plaintiffs
upon two contracts for the direct payment of money." Id., 390 P.2d at 832. Analyzing the
"question as to whether appellants, at the time of the attachment, were secured within the
meaning of!. C. §§ 8-501,8-502," the Court held that:
The remedy by attachment is purely statutory and summary and a
party must, in order to have the benefit of this statutory process do
everything required by the authorizing statutes. The claim,
therefore, must be one founded upon a contract for the direct
payment of money, the payment of which has not been secured in
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any degree by any of the means specified in the statute. If it has
been so secured, however inadequately, attachment cannot issue,
unless such security has, without any act of the plaintiff, or the
person to whom the security was given, become valueless.
Id. at 835-36 (emphasis added).

•

Similarly, ParkWest's citation to BNC Mortgage, Inc. v. Tax Pros., Inc., 111

Wash.App. 238,46 P.3d 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) supports a finding that the MERS Deeds of
Trust, recorded prior to the Bamson Judgment, are prior in interest. In that case, the defendant
had recorded a pre-judgment writ of attachment against the debtor's property, pursuant to statute,
in 1994; then in 1996, the plaintiff recorded a deed of trust; and then in 1999 the defendant
obtained a judgment. Id. 46 P.3d at 817. The issue was "whether the 1999 judgment relate[d]
back" to the 1994 attachment. !d. at 818. In analyzing that issue, the Washington court
compared deeds of trust and judgment liens, citing the principal that is controlling here: "A
judgment creates a lien against real estate in each county where the judgment is recorded. A
deed of trust creates a lien against the property it describes. The lien first in time is the lien first
in right." Id. at 817. Thus, regardless of the nature of the lien - whether a judgment lien or a
deed of trust - the first recorded lien takes priority.!
•

ParkWest then cites to JI Kislak Mortgage Corp. of Delaware v. William

Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686 (Del. 1972), Rainbow Trust v. Moulton Construction, Inc.,

1 While the Court ultimately found that the later-recorded judgment lien was prior to the previously recorded deed
of trust, that fmding was not a refutation of this principal because the Court's conclusion was based on application
of the plain language of the Washington statute regarding pre-judgment attachment. BNe Mortgage, 46 P.3d at
818. The judgment lien related back to the date of the pre-judgment attachment, which was recorded before the
deed of trust. This case does not involve a pre-judgment writ of attachment, and mechanic's liens are not entitled
to the treatment afforded to pre-judgment writs of attachments, both of which are creatures of statute. Even if it
was entitled to the same treatment, the mechanic's lien was recorded after the MERS Deeds of Trust, so that the
Bamson Judgment lien still would not relate back prior to the MERS Deeds of Trust.
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200 B.R. 785 (Bankr. D. Vet. 1996), and Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, No. 36523,
2010 WL 5186706 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2010), for the proposition that a mechanic's lien attaches as
of the date work commenced. Residential does not challenge this principal - which is codified in
Idaho Code section 45-506 (see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 94
Idaho 489, 492, 491 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1971»; however, Residential rejects, as does Idaho law,
ParkWest's argument that a Judgment Lien attaches as of the date the mechanic's lien attaches.
That argument is not only unsupported, but contrary to statute as cited herein and contrary to the
case law cited by ParkWest.
Given this clear statute and case law, there is simply no basis in law for ParkWest's
argument that the Bamson Judgment constitutes a lien prior in right to First American's, and now
Residential's, interest in the Property.
Next, ParkWest argues that the interest in property ofa trustee ofa deed of trust is
subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings against the grantor of the deed
of trust. This argument is not only unsupported by the law, but contrary to common sense: the

interest of a trustee in a deed of trust is a property right, and it would be a due process violation
for that right to be divested in judicial proceedings to which the trustee was not a party. That is
the whole thrust of the law supporting this Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Residential: a person, including a trustee of a deed of trust, cannot be deprived of property rights
without due process of law, which fundamentally requires that the trustee be a party to legal
proceedings that might affect such property rights.
Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) does not stand for the

proposition that a trustee may be deprived of its property rights without due process - as
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ParkWest's own explanation of Long establishes. The facts at play in Long, as identified by
ParkWest, were:
1.

Williams owned property subject to a deed of trust with Avco as beneficiary. Id.,

671 P.2dat 1049;
2.

When Williams filed bankruptcy, Williams' right to the property was passed to

the bankruptcy trustee by operation of the bankruptcy laws. Id.;
3.

During the administration of the estate, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed the

property to Avco, the beneficiary of the deed of trust. Id.;
4.

Thereafter, A vco instructed the trustee to reconvey the deed of trust. Id.;

5.

Avco then conveyed fee simple title, free and clear of the then-reconveyed deed

oftrust, to Long. !d.
The bankruptcy trustee's conveyance of the Property vested fee simple title in Avco. The deed
of trust - along with any interest of the trustee - ceased to exist upon the reconveyance of the
deed oftrust.
Williams later sued claiming that he held title to the property senior in right to Long
under the twisted theory that because, prior to the bankruptcy, he (Williams) held title to the
property subject to the Avco deed of trust, the bankruptcy trustee had no power to convey the
property. !d. at 1050. The Supreme Court rejected Williams' argument, holding that:
At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy ... Lewis
County Abstract Company [trustee of the Avco deed oftrust] held
nothing more than the power of sale upon the happening of certain
contingencies ....
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable interests
of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's interest as
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this purchased
interest.
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Id. at 1051. The trustee never exercised its power of sale because Avco' s interest in the property

merged with the deed oftrust and the deed of trust was reconveyed before the trustee exercised
its power of sale. Neither Avco's nor the trustee of the Avco deed of trust's rights were taken
from them without due process: Avco received fee simple title to the property, at which case
there was no need for a deed of trust to preserve A vco' s interest in the property, and so the deed
of trust was reconveyed.
The facts in this instant case are very different: MERS' interest in the Property never
merged with its interest in the Deed of Trust, and First American was never authorized to
reconvey the MERS Deeds of Trust. Instead, the "happening of certain contingencies" (i.e.,
Barnson's default of the MERS Deeds of Trust) occurred, and First American exercised its
power of sale under the First MERS Deed of Trust.
IfParkWest's argument were followed, property owners would be at liberty to collude
with any purported mechanic's lien claimant to strip lenders with deeds oftrust or mortgages on
real property of their legal and contractual rights. Consider: a property owner who received a
loan secured by real property, but who no longer desires her land to be burdened with an
encumbrance, could collude with a purported - even fictitious - mechanic's lien claimant, allow
a default judgment to be entered (as Barnson has done with ParkWest here), and then use that
judgment to strip the lender of its interest in the formerly-encumbered property. That technique
could be used by anyone, regardless of the lack of merit to the purported mechanic's lien - even
an abjectly fraudulent claim could strip a lender of its rights. Under ParkWest's argument, the
lender would not need to be named in the lawsuit and would not even learn of the suit until after
the judgment had been entered and the "lien claimant" had obtained a senior interest in the
property.
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This is the very result that the body of case law relied on by the Court in reaching its
judgment in this case is designed to avoid. It is precisely what the Idaho Court of Appeals was
guarding against when it held, in Bonner Building Supply, Inc., that:
I.C. § 45-1202 does not enable a materialman to foreclose a lien as
against other interested parties without giving them notice of the
proceedings.
Therefore, although Bonner was not required to name Standard as
a party to the foreclose action ... the failure to do so left Standards'
interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure. Because
Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six months of
the filing of its claim of lien, it lost its lien against the property in
regard to Standard.
Bonner Building Supply, Inc., 682 P.2d at 639. Due process protects against exactly the kind of

thing ParkWest urges for now. ParkWest's argument finds no support in the law, and should be
rejected.
Finally, ParkWest repeats its argument that the only power a trustee of a deed of trust
possesses is a power ofsale; however, ParkWest inexplicably jumps from that premise to the

argument that Residential acquired all other attributes of ownership through Barnson. Like
ParkWest's other arguments, that argument is directly contrary to Idaho statute and directly
contrary to Long v. Williams, on which ParkWest so heavily relies. Idaho Code sections 45-1508
and 45-1506 expressly state that "A sale made by a trustee ... shall foreclose and terminate all
interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom notice is given,"
including "The grantor in the trust deed," and "Any person having a lien or interest subsequent to
the interest of the trustee in the trust deed where such lien or interest appears of record."
Therefore, once the trustee has executed its power of sale under the deed of trust, the rights of the
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"grantor in the trust deed" are foreclosed, and all rights, powers, and attributes of ownership are
transferred by the trustee to the transferee - in this case, by First American to Residential.

Long v. Williams itself refutes ParkWest's nonsensical argument. In the most critical
passage of the opinion not quoted by ParkWest, the Supreme Court states:
[L]egal title is conveyed [via a deed of trust] solely for the purpose
of security, leaving in the trustor or his successors a legal estate in
the property, as against all persons except the trustees and those
lawfully claiming under them. Except as to the trustees and
those holding under them, the trustor or his successor is treated by
our law as the holder of the legal title. The legal estate thus left in
the trustor or his successors entitles them to the possession of the
property until their rights have been fully divested by a
conveyance made by the trustees in the lawful execution of their
trust, and entitles them to exercise all the ordinary incidents of
ownership, in regard to the property, subject always, of course, to
the execution of the trust.

Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that all attributes of ownership of property
subject to a deed of trust are precisely that: held by the owner subject to the trustee.
ParkWest's citation to Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312,824 P.2d 887 (1991)
supports this rule. In Willis, the property owner defaulted on the deed of trust. The beneficiary
then commenced foreclosure proceedings, but before those proceedings were completed the
beneficiary entered into negotiations with a third party to assign her rights in the deed of trust
and entered the property, changed the locks, and stripped the property of appliances, fixtures, and
furnishings, damaging the property in the process. Id. 824 P.2d at 889. The Court noted that the
grantor of a deed of trust retains the right of possession and all incidents of ownership of the
property, except "in the event a/the grantor's default on the underlying obligation."

Here, as

in Willis, the exception applied: because Barnson had defaulted on the deed of trust, First
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American had the right to convey, as it did to Residential, fee simple title, including the right of
possession and all incidents of ownership.

IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, MERS requests that this Court deny ParkWest's Motion
For Reconsideration And Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment.
DATED THIS

Uqy

day of March, 2011.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

BY~

Ryan T. McFarland, ISB No. 7347
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC
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Ryan T. McFarland, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel for Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC in the

foregoing action and make this affidavit on my own personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Default Judgment

Against Julie G. Bamson Only, recorded in the real property records of Canyon County, Idaho
on October 9,2008.
3.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

I, Teri French, a Notary Public, do hereby certify that on.this z..~bdday of March, 2011,
personally appeared before me Ryan T. McFarland, who, being by me first duly sworn, declared
that he is an attorney of record for Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC in
the foregoing action, that he signed the foregoing document as an attorney for Defendant
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, and that the statements therein contained are
true.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My commission expires June 27,2014
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Facsimile (208) 385-5384
rbb@rnoffatt.com
23095.0001
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 07-8274
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
JULIE G. BARNSON ONLY

vs.
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
Homecomings Financial, LLC (fi'k/a
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
Delaware limited liability company; and
DOES 1-10;
Defendants.
THIS MATTER having come before the Court wherein: (a) PlaintiffParkWest
Homes LLC ("ParkWest") filed (i) its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7, 2007,
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(ii) its First Amended Verified Complaint to Forec1ose Lien on September 12, 2007, and (iii) its

Second Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien on September 4, 2008 (the "SAC"); (b) attorney
David E. Wisbney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Defendant Julie G. Bamson
("Bamson") dated August 31, 2007; (c) cOlmsel for ParkWest and Bamson have now filed on
behalf of their respective clients a Stipulation for Entry of Default Judgment, by which, inter
alia, Bamson consented to the filing of the SAC and the entry of default judgment in ParkWest's

favor against Bamson, provided no award for damages was taken against Bamson personally;
and (d) by reason of the foregoing matters, ParkWest is entitled to judgment against Bamson as
requested in the SAC;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED as follows:
1.

For purposes of this Judgment, and when referred to hereafter, the term

"Property" shall mean that certain real property located at 28123 Silo Way, Wilder, Idaho, and
more particularly described as follows: Lot 4 in Block 1 of Riverbend Subdivision, according to
the official plat thereof, filed in Book 34 of Plats at Page 2, Official Records of Canyon County,
Idaho.
2.

ParkWest shall have judgment against Bamson to the extent of her interest

in the Property, but not personally, for the following amounts as pled in the SAC: $141,208.39
for the amount owed to ParkWest as of November 28,2006, with respect to its construction of
improvements to the Property; prejudgment interest at the agreed rate of 18% per annum, or
$69.64 per diem, from November 28,2006, through the date of entry of this Judgment; and
$33,000.00 for the costs of perfecting and enforcing ParkWest's lien, costs of suit, and
reasonable attorney fees.
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3.

Jurisdiction over this cause is hereby expressly reserved and retained for

the purpose of making such further orders as may be necessary in order to carry this Judgment
into effect and as may be necessary or desirable.
4.

This Judgment shall be considered to be a final judgment against Bamson

and is intended to constitute the final judgment against her in this action.
DATED this ~ day of _ _n,-'-...L.!=c::r;~~=:>..r::>oC>..-_ 2008.

GORDON W. PETRIE
District Judge

WILUA ~.

Court

By'

....'.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of September 2008, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST .JULIE G. BARNSON
ONLY to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 W. Main St., Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Facsimile (208) 342-3829

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

David E. Wishney

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LA W

300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile (208) 342-5749
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

<0

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of
~1
2008, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
JULIE G. BAR..l'~'SON ONLY to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 W. Main St., Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Facsimile (208) 342-3829

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

David E. Wishney
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile (208) 342-5749

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Robert B. Bums

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise. ID 83701
Facsimile (208) 385-5384

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

MOFFATT, THOMAS.

WILLIAM H. HURST
CLERK OF THE COURT

)21~~

By
Deputy Clerk
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Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
rbb@moffatt.com
23095.0001

MAR 28 2011
CANYON COUN1Y CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Case No. CV 07-8274

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF (i) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
(ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT

vs.
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
Delaware limited liability company; and
DOES 1-10;
Defendants,
and
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Defendant/Intervenor.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") does
not dispute any of the following contentions argued by Plaintiff ParkWest Homes LLC
("ParkWest") in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and
(ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("ParkWest's Memorandum"), filed March 7, 2011:
•

That ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the property at issue (the

"Property") on May 18, 2006-a date six months before MERS 1 recorded its two deeds of trust
against the Property.2 ParkWest's Memorandum 6-7.
•

That ParkWest's judgment against the owner's interest in the Property (the

"Bamson Judgment") became final not later than January 26, 2009-a date six months prior to
Residential's acquisition of the Property. ParkWest's Memorandum 3 n.!.
•

That both the fact and effect of the Barnson Judgment were put squarely at

issue in this lawsuit by ParkWest's Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien, filed
September 14,2010. ParkWest's Memorandum 4.
Moreover, in its opposition Residential admits that the Bamson Judgment was
recorded against the Property on October 9, 2008-a date nine months prior to Residential's
acquisition ofthe Property. Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Defendant Residential
Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("McFarland Aff."), filed March 23,2011, at ~ 2 and Ex. A.

1

I.e., Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS").

2 See Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Residential's
Opposition"), filed March 23, 2011, at 12 ("Residential does not challenge this principal
[sic] ... ").
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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Accordingly, there is no question in this dispute that the lien of the Bamson
Judgment is at issue in this lawsuit and that Residential had constructive notice of the Barnson
Judgment when Residential purchased the Property.3 Rather, the question here presented is
whether the trustee under MERS' two deeds of trust, First American Title Insurance Company
("First American"), could convey the Property to Residential free and clear of the lien
established by the recorded Bamson Judgment ("ParkWest's Judgment Lien"). Or otherwise
stated, Residential contends that although ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the Property
six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust-and was therefore senior in priority to
any interest in the Property granted by the deeds oftrust-ParkWest lost the priority of its
mechanic's lien by perfecting it through entry of the Bamson Judgment.
The argument is without legal basis, for the reasons discussed below.

II.

ARGUMENT

The question of whether First American could convey the Property to Residential
free and clear of ParkWest's Judgment Lien cannot be answered without first determining the
interests in the Property held, respectively, by First American and Defendant Julie Barnson
("Bamson") at the time First American executed its trustee's sale of the Property. The several
sub-issues necessary to properly determine the respective interests of Bamson and First
American as of that sale are set forth below, followed by a rebuttal of the policy arguments
raised by Residential.

3 See Idaho Code § 55-801 ("Any ... judgment affecting the title to or possession of real
property may be recorded ... ") and Idaho Code § 55-811 ("Every conveyance ... recorded as
prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of
the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers ... ").
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Client:1986905.1
AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 3

555

A.

Any Interest in the Property Held by First American Was Subject to
ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien.

As noted above, Residential concedes that the mechanic's lien claimed by
ParkWest attached to the Property six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust
against the Property. Accordingly, because the interest in the Property of Bamson was
encumbered by ParkWest's mechanic's lien prior to Bamson's grant ofMERS' two deeds of
trust, any interest in the Property conveyed by Barnson under the two deeds of trust was also
subject to ParkWest's mechanic's lien.
In this regard, both common sense and statute dictate that First American could
convey no more to Residential than Bamson, as the grantor of MERS , two deeds of trust, could
herself convey. Thus, Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10) provides:
The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest
in the property which the grantor had, or had the power to convey,
at the time of the execution by him of the trust deed together with
any interest the grantor or his successors in interest acquired after
the execution of such trust deed.
(Emphasis added.)
B.

Barnson Had the Right Under Idaho Law to Stipulate to the Terms of the
Barnson Judgment.

Neither Residential nor MERS has at any time challenged Bamson's right under
Idaho law to settle with ParkWest by stipulating to the entry of the Bamson Judgment, which by
its express terms awarded ParkWest "judgment against Barnson to the extent of her interest in
the Property .... " McFarland Aff. Ex. A, at 2 ~ 2. Thus, it is only the effect, and not the fact, of
the Bamson Judgment that is here at issue.
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AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 4
Client:1986905.1

556

C.

ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien Encumbering Barnson's Interest in the
Property Was Merged into the Barnson Judgment.
The general rule with respect to the merger of an inchoate claim into a final

judgment is summarized in American Jurisprudence 2d as follows:
As a general rule, when a valid final judgment is rendered,
the original debt or cause of action, or underlying obligation upon
which an adjudication is predicated, merges into the judgment.
The original claim is extinguished and a new cause of action on a
judgment is substituted for it. ... [f1 It is immaterial whether the
judgment is rendered upon a verdict; or upon a motion to dismiss
or other objection to the pleadings; or upon consent, confession, or
default.
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 458 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
Accordingly, when the Bamson Judgment became final six months prior to
Residential's acquisition of the Property, ParkWest's mechanic's lien encumbering Bamson's
interest in the Property was merged into the Bamson Judgment and thereby extinguished.

D.

The Priority of ParkWest's Judgment Lien Relates Back to, and Is
Established by, the Priority of ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien.
Because the Barnson Judgment was recorded against the Property after MERS'

two deeds of trust were recorded, Residential argues that First American's interest in the
Property had priority over ParkWest's Judgment Lien. See Residential's Opposition 8 ("It
follows that a judgment takes priority over a conveyance only when the judgment has been
entered by the Court and then recorded in the real property records prior to the conveyance. ").
Or put otherwise, Residential contends that although ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the
Property six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust, ParkWest lost the priority of
its mechanic's lien by perfecting it through entry of the Bamson Judgment. The established law
with respect to the effect of final judgments is contra.
As also explained in American Jurisprudence 2d:
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A lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a
judgment generally is not affected by such merger. If a debt is of
such a character that a lien is given by common law or statute, the
merger of the judgment does not involve a merger of the lien and
the latter may continue until the debt is satisfied. An assignment
or lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a judgment is not
affected by the merger; the merger does not destroy the character
of the debt. If a creditor has a lien upon property of the debtor
and obtains a judgment against the debtor, the creditor does not
thereby lose the benefit of the lien. The judgment only changes the
form of the action for recovery. The creditor retains the right to
enforce a lien or gain possession of property held as collateral for
the debt. The reason for this rule is to avoid the obvious injustice
offorcing the assignee or lien holder to lose its security preference
by pursuing its claim to judgment.
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 462 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The

foregoing legal principles are supported by a multitude of authorities cited in the omitted
footnotes. 4
Therefore, as previously argued in ParkWest's Memorandum, the priority of
ParkWest's Judgment Lien relates back to, and is established by, the priority of ParkWest's
mechanic's lien-which is a date six months before MERS recorded its two deeds of trust
against the Property.

4 ParkWest concurs with Residential's argument that, by application ofIdaho Code
Section 10-1110, ParkWest's Judgment Lien became a lien on the Property upon recordation of
the Bamson Judgment. Residential's Memorandum 7. However, the question of when
ParkWest's Judgment Lien first attached to the Property is distinct from the question of whether
the priority of ParkWest's Judgment Lien relates back to, and is established by, the priority of
ParkWest's mechanic's lien. Residential, of course, cites no case or secondary authority
supporting its argument that '''ParkWest's Judgment Lien' cannot relate back to when ParkWest
allegedly started work on the Property .... " Id (emphasis in original).

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 6
Client:1986905.1

558

E.

Residential Acquired the Property Subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien.
The fact that First American could not convey the Property free and clear of

ParkWest's Judgment Lien is established by the decision in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585,
671 P.2d 1048 (1983), where our Supreme Court held as follows:
We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee
nothing more than a power of sale, capable of exercise upon the
occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default in payment)
and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of
ownership ....
Id. at 586,671 P.2d at 1049 (emphasis added). And then further held:

Therefore, we hold that, even though title passes for the purpose of
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage
with power of sale.
Id. at 587-88,671 P.2d at 1050-51. 5

The opinion in Long is fully summarized in ParkWest's Memorandum at
pages 7-9, but the essence of the case is as follows:
1.

The grantor ofthe deed of trust conveyed title to the trustee before filing
bankruptcy;

5

Accord Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991):

Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to
the property in the trustee. Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a
mortgage with a power of sale; the legal title is conveyed to the
trustee solely for the purpose of security. The deed of trust leaves
in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to possession
of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the
grantor's default on the underlying obligation. See Long v.
Williams .. ..
Id. at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Client:1986905.1
AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 7

559

2.

After the grantor filed bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed all
remaining interests of the grantor in the subject property to the beneficiary
under the deed of trust;

3.

The trustee under the deed of trust later reconveyed title to the grantor;
and

4.

Our Supreme Court held that the trustee's deed to the grantor was without
legal effect, as the trustee's title had been divested as a matter oflaw
wholly without involvement by the trustee in the bankruptcy proceedings. 6

Thus, the decision in Long unequivocally establishes that the interest in property a trustee under
a deed of trust can convey is subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings
involving solely the grantor of the deed of trust. 7

6

Or as our Supreme Court explained:
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable
interests of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's
interest as beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this
purchased interest. Thus, Avco was the owner of the property and
entitled to possession subject only to the satisfaction of the
homestead interest of Williams and to Long's inferior judgment
lien. Consequently, when Lewis County Abstract executed the
Deed of Reconveyance, it conveyed no interest.

Id. at 588, 671 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis added). (Obviously if a trustee under a deed of trust holds
a property interest in encumbered property and not merely a power of sale, as Residential
contends in this dispute, Lewis County Abstract's property interest could not have been
conveyed by the trustee in Williams' bankruptcy and Lewis County Abstract's subsequent deed
of reconveyance would have conveyed such property interest back to Williams.)
7 Residential seeks to distinguish Long by pointing out that there no trustee's sale ever
occurred. See Residential's Memorandum 15-16 (first stating that "once the trustee has executed
its power ofsale [emphasis added] under the deed of trust, the rights ofthe 'grantor in the trust
deed' are foreclosed," and then quoting our Supreme Court's quotation of Bank ofItaly Nat 'I
Trust & Savings Ass 'n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940,944-45 (Cal. 1933)). Although Residential
asserts the quoted material on which it relies is "the most critical passage of the opinion" in
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Based on the points and authorities discussed previously, there is no question that
Barnson could not convey her interest in the Property by the two deeds of trust she granted free
and clear of the mechanic's lien claimed by ParkWest, or that the trustee under these deeds of
trust did not acquire title to the Property before ParkWest's mechanic's lien had attached.
Neither First American nor its predecessor trustee, therefore, ever held title before ParkWest's
lien had already attached to the Property. The question therefore becomes whether the interest in
the Property First American could convey was subject to the merger of ParkWest's inchoate
claim to a mechanic's lien into the Bamson Judgment. The decision in Long establishes that it
was.
Accordingly, when First American executed its power of sale and deeded the
Property to Residential, Residential acquired the Property encumbered by ParkWest's Judgment
Lien.

F.

Residential's Policy Arguments for Disregarding ParkWest's Judgment Lien
Are Without Merit.
Wholly ignoring the holding in Long that a "deed of trust conveys to the trustee

nothing more than a power of sale," Residential argues:
the interest of a trustee in a deed of trust is a property right, and it
would be a due process violation for that right to be divested in
judicial proceedings to which the trustee was not a party. That is
the whole thrust of the law supporting this Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Residential: a person, including a
trustee of a deed of trust, cannot be deprived of property rights
Long, the quotation is to the law of California and not included within the stated holdings in
Long-a fact Residential fails to disclose. Residential has also deleted the references in the
quoted material to the California statutes and case law on which this "most critical passage" is
based, thereby further obfuscating the fact that the quoted material relates to the law of
California, not Idaho. Moreover, the attempted distinction is without legal substance for the
elemental reason that the Barnson Judgment was entered long prior to the date First American
executed its power of sale, while Bamson still held "all incidents of ownership .... "

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 9
Client: 1986905.1

561

without due process of law, which fundamentally requires that the
trustee be a party to legal proceedings that might affect such
property rights.
Residential's Memorandum 12.
But, of course, not only did our Supreme Court hold in Long that, "even though
title passes for the purpose of the trust," the trustee obtains "nothing more than a power of sale,"
but the decision in Long established that the interest in property a trustee can convey is subject to
divestiture as a result of legal proceeding not involving the trustee. 8 Moreover, Residential cites

no authority whatsoever in support of its contention that First American held a property right
under Idaho law that was subject to due-process protections.
Residential next argues:
IfParkWest's argument were followed, property owners
would be at liberty to collude with any purported mechanic's lien
claimant to strip lenders with deeds of trust or mortgages on real
property of their legal and contractual rights. Consider: a
property owner who received a loan secured by real property, but
who no longer desires her land to be burdened with an
encumbrance, could collude with a purported - even fictitious mechanic's lien claimant, allow a default judgment to be entered
(as Barnson has done with ParkWest here), and then use that
judgment to strip the lender of its interest in the formerlyencumbered property. That technique could be used by anyone,
regardless ofthe lack of merit to the purported mechanic's lieneven an abjectly fraudulent claim could strip a lender of its rights.
Under ParkWest's argument, the lender would not need to be
named in the lawsuit and would not even learn of the suit until
after the judgment had been entered and the "lien claimant" had
obtained a senior interest in the property.
Residential's Memorandum 14.

8

See note 6 supra.
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The foregoing argument is a red herring for the following elemental reasons:
•

First - and most importantly - because a mortgage lien is unquestionably a

property interest subject to due-process protections, the Bamson Judgment would have had no
adverse effect on MERS' liens under its two deeds of trust so long as MERS retained its liens
and contested the amount of the Barnson Judgment in this lawsuit.
•

Second, after the Bamson Judgment was entered, MERS could have

judicially foreclosed the liens under its two deeds of trust in this lawsuit, rather than effecting a
trustee's sale during the pendency of this lawsuit.
•

Third, because MERS has since the beginning of this lawsuit been a party

defendant and the lender's nominee designated to protect the lender's interests under MERS' two
deeds of trust, the interests ofMERS and the lender have at all times been defended by counsel
of their choice.
•

Fourth, neither MERS nor Residential has made any contention in this

lawsuit that Barnson in fact did anything wrong in settling ParkWest's claim by stipulating to the
terms of the Barnson Judgment.
•

Fifth, MERS had the right to challenge the Barnson Judgment when first

entered under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and then under I.R.C.P. 60(b) prior to MERS' dismissal, and
Residential still has the right under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to challenge the Bamson Judgment under
certain grounds, including for fraud upon the court.
•

Sixth, the same protections afforded MERS and Residential under our

foreclosure laws and civil rules just referenced are equally applicable to all lenders and
purchasers of real property in other instances.
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•

Seventh, absolutely no challenge to the Barnson Judgment has been made

by MERS, Residential, or Bamson herself-who is being sued for the amount of ParkWest's
recovery in this lawsuit by the title insurance company that insured the priority of MERS' two
deeds of trust without bothering to ask ParkWest whether it had been paid for its work.
Finally, the Court should note that Residential, which as a matter of law had
constructive notice of ParkWest's Judgment Lien, almost certainly had actual notice of the lien
as well. Therefore, Residential almost equally as certainly would have paid a sweetheart price
for the Property at First American's trustee's sale. Under these circumstances there can be no
surprise hardship claimed by Residential by reason of its failure to stiff Park West for the
reasonable value of its work in building Barnson's house, as Residential acquired precisely what
it thought it was buying: the Property encumbered by ParkWest's Judgment Lien.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing points and authorities, together with those argued in
ParkWest's Memorandum, ParkWest respectfully requests the Court to reconsider the
memorandum decision it entered in this case and then alter and amend the judgment to provide
that Residential's interest in the Property is held subject to ParkWest's Judgment Lien.
DATED this 28th day of March 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of March 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland
& HAWLEY LLP
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In accordance with the Court's invitation to do so extended at the March 30, 2011,
hearing in this matter (the "Hearing"). PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC (HParkWest") hereby
submits its supplemental authority and argument in support of its pending motions for
reconsideration and to alter or amend the judgment entered by the Court.

A.

The Court Has Jurisdiction to Reconsider Its Memorandum Decision and
Alter or Amend Its Judgment Based on the New Issues Presented by
ParkWest.

The Court asked counsel for ParkWest at the Hearing if the Court could properly
reconsider its memorandum decision based on new issues raised in ParkWest's motion for
reconsideration. As our Supreme Court's opinion in the prior appeal in this lawsuit establishes.
this Court plainly can consider new issues raised by ParkWest in deciding its motion for
reconsideration. ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603. 608,238 P.3d 203. 208
(2010) (parkWest "argues that after it registered on May 2, 2006, Barnson ratified the contract.

That issue was not presented to the district court, and so we will not consider it on appeal. ...

ParkWest could have flied a motion/or reconsideration." (emphasis added»: A court is
equally allowed to consider new evidence in deciding a motion for reconsideration under
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472~ 147 PJd 100, 104 (Ct. App.

I Cf. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263. 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding,
prior to the adoption o/I.R. c.P. 11 (a)(2)(BJ, that where a "motion for 'reconsideration' raises
new issues, or presents new information, not addressed to the court prior to the decision which
resulted in the judgment, the proper analogy is to a motion for relief from judgment under
Rule 60(b).").
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2006) C'the case law applying Rule 11(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a
motion is brought under the rule .. ," (emphasis in original)).:!
Furthennore, the law ofIdaho establishes that a district court may enter summary
judgment for the non~moving party where merited. Thus, as held in Harwood v. Talbert. 136
Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001):
In this case, partial summary judgment was granted to
Harwood, the non-moving party. This Court has determined
"[s]ununary judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the
moving party, on any or all the causes of action involved, under the
rule of civil procedure" thus allowing trial courts flexibility in
detennining the form of relief granted in summary judgment
orders.
ld. at 677, 39 P.3d at 617 (brackets in original; citation omitted).

Accordingly, after reconsidering its memorandum decision, the Court has
jurisdiction to alter or amend its judgment to provide that Defendant Residential Funding Real
Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential") holds its interest in the property here at issue (the
"Property") subject to the judgment lien arising out of the recorded judgment entered in
ParkWest's favor against Defendant Julie Bamson (the "Barnson Judgment"), the fonner owner
of the Property.

2 The opinion in Johnson also establishes that a district court can reconsider an
interlocutory order on which judgment subsequently was entered, provided the motion for
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. l1(a)(2)(B) is filed prior to entry of the judgment See id at 471,
147 P.3d at 103 eOn November 2, 2004, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration....
Judgment was entered three days later ..."). Accordingly~ this Court has jurisdiction to alter or
amend its judgment following reconsideration of its memorandum decision. See id. at n.3
("Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the opportunity to correct errors both of fact or
law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action
short of an appeal.").
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A Trustee Under Il Deed of Trust Can Be Removed by the Beneficiary Under
Idaho Law for Any Reason at All.
After counsel for ParkWest submitted at the Hearing the recorded "Appointment

of Successor Trustee," by which First American Title Insurance Company ("First American")
succeeded to the position of trustee under the MERS3 deed of trust that First American
foreclosed by power of sale. the Court asked whether the deed of trust contained a provision
providing for the appointment of a successor trustee - a question counsel for neither party could
then answer. In this regard~ although the subject deed of trust happens to contain such a
provision,4 the provision essentially paraphrases Idaho Code Section 45-1504(2), which provides
that "the beneficiary may,for any reason obtain the resignation of the trustee" (emphasis added).
and thereupon nominate and appoint a successor trustee.
Thus, both MERS' deed of trust and Idaho Code Section 45"1504(2) are entirely
consistent with the decisions in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586~ 671 P.2d 1048, 1049
(1983) ("We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of
sale ... ~')~ and Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 314 n.2, 824 P.2d 887,889 (Ct.
App. 1991) ("Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of sale ...").
Additionally, and as was pointed out in ParkWest's earlier reply memorandum, Residential has
cited no authority whatsoever in support of its contention that First American held a property
right under Idaho law that was subject to due-process protections.
3

I.e., Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERSH).

4 See Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Residential Funding Real Estate
Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment. filed November 17, 2010, Ex. A at p. 13 of 15,
~ 24 ("Lender may,for any reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a
successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder." (emphasis added)).
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Moreover, the question of whether First American once held a property right
subject to constitutional protection is immaterial to the just resolution of ParkWest's pending
motions for the reasons summarized below.
C.

The Lien of the Barnson Judgment Relates Back to, and Hils Priority From,
the Date ParkWest's Mechanic's Lien Attached to the Property.

As argued by ParkWest's counsel at the Hearing, based on the undisputed facts
and law submitted in support of ParkWest's pending motions, both motions tum on the
resolution of one issue: Whether the lien of the Bamson Judgment relates back to, and has
priority from, the date ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the Property - which was six
months before MERS recorded its two deeds oftrust.~ Thus. the following issues are not in
dispute;
1.

ParkWest's mechanic's lien attached to the Property on May 18,2006,

when ParkWest commenced work. 6 Terra-West, Inc. v.Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, No. 36523,2010
WL 5186706, at *8 (Idaho Dec. 23. 2010) (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the time that work is
commenced under a contract ...").

5 Although

Residential has done its very best to confuse the issues of (i) when the
Bamson Judgment attached to the Property; and (if) whether, after it attached, the priority of the
judgment lien related back to, and was established by, the priority ofParkWest's mechanic's
lien. these two issues are obviously separate questions - with only the second of the two issues
remaining in dispute.
6 Memorandum Decision and Order on MER8' Motion for Protective Order, ParkWest's
Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to Dismiss. Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Residential's Motion in Limine ("Memorandum Decision"), filed February 16,2011, at 11.
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MERS' two deeds of trust were recorded six months after ParkWest's

mechanic's lien attached to the Property, on November 14,2006,7
3.

Therefore, the interest Bamson had in the Property when she granted

MERS' two deeds of trust was encumbered by ParkWest's mechanic's lien, as was the interest in
the Property conveyed by First American to Residential. Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10) ("The
trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest in the property which the grantor had, or
had the power to convey. at the time of the execution by him of the trust deed ...tt).
4.

The Bamson Judgment was recorded by the Canyon County Recorder on

October 9,2008,8 and attached to the Property upon recording. Idaho Code Section lO l110
w

(from the time ajudgment is recorded by a county recorder, ''the judgment so recorded becomes
a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt from
,
")
executlon
....

5.

Residential acquired the Property at First American's trustee's sale on

July 20,2009/ nine months after the Bamson Judgment was recorded.
6.

Therefore, Residential had constructive notice of the Bamson Judgment

when Residential purchased the Property. Idaho Code Section 55~801 ("Any ... judgment
affecting title to or possession of real property may be recorded ...It) and Idaho Code Section

7

Memorandum Decision 11.

8 Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Defendant Residential Funding Real
Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 23, 2011, at ~ 2 and Ex. A.
9

Memorandum Decision 11.
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55-811 ("Every conveyance ... recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the
recorder for record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers ...").
With respect to the one material issue that remains in dispute - whether the lien of
the Bamson Judgment rela.tes back tOt and has priority from, the date ParkWest·s mechanic's lien
attached to the Property - Residential has yet to cite a single case or secondary authority
supporting its contention the lien does not relate back. Conversely, ParkWest relies on the
following authorities and secondary authority cited and quoted in its earlier supporting and reply
memorandums to support its contention the lien does relate back:

•

BNG Mortgage, Inc. 11. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812,818 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002) ("In general, a judgment lien against real estate relates back to the
date on which the real estate was attached." (footnote with citations to
multiple supporting authorities omitted)).

•

J.L Kislak Mortgage Corp. ofDelaware v. William Matthews Builder,
Inc., 287 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) ("The lien of judgment for
a mechanic's lien relates back to the time that the contractor commenced
work or first supplied materia!."). Accord In re Rainbow Trust, Bus.
Trust, 200 B.R. 785, 789 (Bank!. D. Vt. 1996). aff'd. 216 B.R. 77 (B.A.P.
2d Cir. 1997).

•

American Jurisprudence 2d:
A lien securing a debt which becomes merged in ajudgment
generally is not affected by such merger. If a debt is of such a character
that a lien is given by common law or statute, the merger of the judgment
does not involve a merger of the lien and the latter may continue until the
debt is satisfied. An assignment or lien securing a debt which becomes
merged in a judgment is not affected by the merger; the merger does not
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destroy the character of the debt. If a creditor has a lien upon property of
the debtor and obtains ajudgment against the debtor, the creditor does not
thereby lose the benefit of the lien. The judgment only changes the form
of the action for recovery. The creditor retains the right to enforce a lien
or gain possession of property held as collateral for the debt. The reason
for this rule is to avoid the obvious injustice of forcing the assignee or lien
holder to lose its security preference by pursuing its claim to judgment.
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 462 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted).
D.

MERS Voluntarily Extinguished Its Interest in the Property by Effecting an
Elective Trustee's Sale.

As argued by ParkWest in its reply memorandum and at the Hearing, the Bamson
Judgment would have had no adverse effect on MERS' liens under its two deeds of trust had
MERS elected to judicially foreclose its liens, rather than electing to effect a trustee's sale during
the pendency of this lawsuit. However, as this Court properly held, "once Residential became
the owner of the property pursuant to the Trustee's Deed, :MERS' interest was extinguished."
Memorandum Decision 9. Obviously any arguable interest in the Property attributable to First
American under MERS' two deeds of trust was then also extinguished.
Accordingly~

although MERS had the absolute right to litigate the amount of

ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien until MERS elected to effect a trustee's sale - and thereby
extinguish both its and First American's interests in the Property - :MERS voluntarily elected to
walk away from this litigation and its challenge to ParkWest's mechanic's lien. The legal effect
of MERS' decision thus inures as a direct result of MERS' own voluntary election made during
the course of this lawsuit; and not as a result of anything ParkWest or Defendant Bamson did
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that would "strip lenders with deeds of trust or mortgages on real property of their legal and
contractual rights,n as Residential has argued,lo
DATED this 15th day of April 2011.
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BA.RRETI, ROCK &
FlELDS, CHARTERED
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Finn
Butfis - Of the
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of April 2011, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF (i) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND (ii) MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland
HAwLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

877 W. Main St., Ste. 1000
P.O, Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Facsimile (208) 954-5223 and (208) 954-5236

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

~Lf1~

/~B.B

s

Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, fued March 23, 2011, at
14.
10

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
(i) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND (Ii) MOTION TO ALTER

OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 9

ClI.nt1getsIS79.1

574

4/15/2011 4:42:29 PM

Teri French

Stephen C. Hardesty ISB No. 4214
Ryan T. McFarland ISB No. 7347
Jake D. McGrady ISB No. 8209
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA \VLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, 1D 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 954-5236
Email: shardesty@hawle).1roxell.com
rmcfarJ and@hawleytroxell.com

Hawl

xell

Page 2

y:J
F 1 .A.bo¥ Q.M.
APR 1§ 2011
OANYON COUNTY CLERK
~CRAWFORO,OEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited)
liability company,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmanied woman; )
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
)
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
)
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
)
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/kla
)
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
)
Delaware limited liability company; and
)
DOES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants

Case No. CV 07-8274
DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL
FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS,
LLC'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

and
)

RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE )
HOLDINGS. LLC, a Delaware limited
)
)
liability company,
)
DefendantlCounterc!aimant.
)
)

----------DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDiNGS, LLC'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOnON FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMENTI JUDGMENT - 1
05000.0047.2334847.1

575

4/15/2011 4:42:49 PM

Teri French

Page 3

Hawl

Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Residential"), by and
through its counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully files this
Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration and

1\'1otion To Alter Or Amend Judgment (collectively, "Motions").

I.
INTRODUCTION
This Court cOlTectly granted summary judgment in favor of Residential, and ParkWest
has not provided this Court with any basis in fact or law for reconsidering or altering that
judgment. Instead, ParkWest's Motions ask this Court to set aside an entire body of case and
statutory law and invite collusion and fraud by every single property owner in the State of Idaho
whose property is encumbered by a deed of tmst. It is contrary to due process and the plain
language of statute for ParkWest to use its stipulated judgment against Bamson to eliminate the
interests of persons who were never party to the lawsuit and never parties to the stipulated
judgment. To be clear: ParkWest's lien pursuant to its stipulated judgment against Juli Bamson

does not relate back to the date its mechanic's lien might have attached because, under
Idabo Code section 45-510, ParkWest's mechanic's lien expired as to First American long
before the judgment lien against Barnson was ever entered.
II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural history are set forth in various places in this matter's now
lengthy record. In summary, the facts releva..,t to these Motions are that:
1.

After filing its mechanic's lien (ParkWest's "Lien") in November 2006, ParkWest

named as Defendants only the Property owner, Juli Bamson ("Barnson"), and Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems (<iMERS"), the beneficiary of two deeds of tlUst (the "First and
Second MERS Deeds of Trust") recorded against the Property, ParkWest never named First
DEFENDANT RESiDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S
OPPOSITlON TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
ALTER OR Al\;fEND JUDGMENT - 2
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American Title Insuranee Company ("First American"), the Trustee of the First MERS Deed of
Trust, who held legal title to the Property.

2.

On or about September 30,2008, ParkWest and Barnson filed a Stipulation For

Entry Of Default Judgment (the "Stipulation") which pennitted ParkWest to take "immediate
possession of the Property;" in exchange, ParkWest agreed to "waive and release[] Barnson from
any personal liability related to or arising out of ParkWest's improvement of the Property."
MERS was not a pmty to the Stipulation. First American (who has never been a party to the
case) and Residential (who was not then a party to the case) were not parties to the Stipulation
either. Pursuant to the Stipulation, this Court entered the Default Judgment Against Julie G.
Barnson Only (the "Barnson Judgment") on October 7.2008, which ParkWest then recorded.

3.

On July 9,2009, Homecomings Financial, LLC ("Homecomings"), the lender

under the First and Second MERS Deeds of Trust, foreclosed on the First MERS Deed of Trust
and First American conveyed the Property to Residential via Trustee's Deed.
4.

Residential intervened in this case on November 4,2010.

5.

Residential filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pm-suant to Idaho Code section

45-510, based on ParkWest's failure to name First American as a party defendant, which this
Court granted on February 16,2011. On March 1,2011, this Court entered Judgment in favor of
Residential that Residential's interest "is, for all purposes, prior and senior to ParkWest's
interest. "

III.
ARGUMENT

A.

This Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was Correctly Granted And Is Founded
On Deeply-Rooted Idaho Law.
This Court~om~~gty granted Residential':. Motion for Summary Judgment based on the

straightfonvard application of Idaho law. Idaho Code section 45-510 provides that a mechanic's
DEFENDANT RESIDENiIAL FUNnING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
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lien becomes void six months after it is filed unless "proceedings be commenced in a proper
court \vithin that time to enforce such lien." There is ample Idaho case law strictly construing
that six-month deadline. See Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104,298 P.2d 972 (1956) (holding that

a mechanic's lien is lost as to a property owner not timely named in a suit, even where the
husband. a co-owner, is named in the lawsuit, because the six month time frame in which to
foreclose a lien "is more than a mere statute of limitations which is waived if not pleaded~ ... it

is a limitation ... upon the right or liability itself; and ... the lien is lost as against the interest of
any person not made a party to an action to enforce it within the six month period"); Palmer v.

Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 401,388 P.2d 96 (1963) (holding that if Idaho Code section 45-510 is
not complied with "no jurisdiction exists in the court to enforce the lien. When the limit fixed by
statute for duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any more than if it had never been created");

Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497,501, 185 P. 554 (1919);
D.W Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 517,518 (9th Cir. 1915);
Continental & Commercial Tmst v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915); and
Utah Imp lemen t- Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 942, 947-48 (D. Idaho 1913). See also
Weyyakin Ranch Property Oi1'11ers' An'n, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1,2-3,896 P.2d
327, 328-29 (1995) (holding that the trial cOlUi never obtained jurisdiction over elected city
officials where the plaintiffs "failed to name the elected officials individually")~ and Collier

Carbon & Chemical Corp. v. Castle Butte, Inc., 109 Idaho 708, 710, 710 P.2d 618,620 (Ct. App.
1985) (holding that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction initially to enter ... judgment" against
persons \vho were not named as defendants in their individual capacity in the complaint).
Because under Idaho Code sections 45-1202 and 45-1513 a deed of trust is a conveyance
of legal title to tJle tmstee of the deed of trust. the failure to na.me the trustee as a pmty defendant
is fatal to a lien claimant's foreclosure action This is the universally recognized rule of law. See
DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S
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52 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 369 (2010). See also Heyward & Lee Constntction Co.,
Inc., v, Sands, Anderson, It1arks, & Miller, 249 Va. 54, 58,453 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1995); Walt

Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986); Riley v. Peters, 194
CaJ.App.2d 296, 15 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W.Va. 458, 63 S.E.
308,311 (1908); Johnson v. Bennett, 6 Colo.App. 362, 367,40 P. 847, 849 (CL App. 1895);

Schillinger Fire-ProofCemem & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 14 N.Y.S. 326, 329 (N.Y. Spec. Term
1891); and Columbia Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Taylor, 25 1l1.App. 429 (1887).
Finally, Bonner Building Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682,
682 P.2d 635 (Cl. App. 1984) stands for the rule that the interest of an unnamed party in property
is "unaffected by" a mechanic's lien foreclosure, and such mechanic's lien is "lost ... against the
property in regard to" unnamed parties.
By application of this extensive body of law, this Court correctly found that ParkWest's
failure to name First American was fatal to ParkWest's Lien as against First American and
ResidentiaL ParkWest's mechanic's Lien was recorded November 28, 2006. Idaho Code section
45-510 required ParkWest to name First American as a Defendant by May 28, 2007, or the Lien
would expire as to First American. This lawsuit was not commenced until August 7,2007. 1
First American was

~

named as a Defendant. When the Bamson Judgment was stipulated to

and entered in October 7,2008, ParkWest's mechanic's Lien had long since expired as a matter
of law as against First American and this Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the Lien as to

! Bamson filed bankruptcy on April 13. 2007, approximately four and one-half months after ParkWest recorded its
Mechanic's Lien. Under II US.c. I08(e), ParkWest's time to foreclose its Lien was extended until 30 days after
termination of the stay. P'arkWest obtaim:d relief from &tay on July 21,2007. ParkWesttben commenced this
action on August 7, 2007. Even if the Court finds that Bamson's bankruptcy to!Jed tbe time for commencing a
foreclosure action agair;st First American, the six months would have expired, at the latest. on August 20,2007,
30 days after ParkWest obtained relief from stay. The 45-510 period (and therefore. ParkWest's mechanic's Lien
as to First American) had certainly expired by February 7, 2008, six months after ParkWest commenced this
lawsuit, which was eight months before ParkWest recorded the Barnson Judgment.
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ParkWest. When First American exercised its power of sale under the First MERS Deed of
Tmst it conveyed the Propelty to Residential free and clear of ParkWest's Lien.

B.

Parl{West's Interest In The Property Pursuant To The Barnson Judgment 'Vas
Never Senior To First American's Interest, And 'Vas Eliminated By The Trustee's
Sale To Residential,

As set forth in Residential's Opposition to ParkWest's Motions, the Bamson Judgment cmmot

eliminate the interests of MERS., First American, or Residential in the Property. Idaho Code
section 10-1110 provides that a judgment lien attaches "from the time of such recording, and

not before" (emphasis added). The Bamson Judgment was recorded October 9,2008, nearly two
years after the First and Second MERS Deeds of Trust. By the plain language of Idaho Code
section 10-1110, "ParkWest's Judgment Lien" cannot relate back to when ParkWest allegedly
started work on the Property and is not prior to the MERS Deeds of Trust.
Idaho's recording laws also reject ParkWest's position. Idaho Code section 55-606.
Judgment liens, like otller conveyances (under Idaho Code section 45-1513, a deed of tmst is
expressly defined as a "conveyance of real property"), have priority only as of the date they are
recorded. A judgment lien is eliminated as to particular property by the foreclosure of a
previously-recorded, i.e., senior, mortgage or deed of trust. Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight,
92 Idaho 210, 440 P.2d 143 (1968). ParkWest's (Bamson) Judgment Lien was therefore
eliminated by the foreclosure of the First MERS Deed of Trust and First American's July 2009
conveyance of the Property to Residential by Trustee's Deed.
Another problem with ParkWest's argument is that the Bmnson Judgment does not say
that the Bamson Judgment lien relates back to the priority date of ParkWest's mechanic's Lien.

Because the Bamson Judgment was the product of a stipulation between ParkWest and Bamson
only, the Bamson Judgment could do no more than grant "ParkWest .. ,judgment against
Bamson to the extent of her interest in the Property." Bamson Judgment, p. 2. The Bamson
DEFENDANT RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC'S
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Judgment could not and did not declare the rank of each lien in the Property (see Idaho Code
section 45-512). The face of the Bamson Judgment is clear: ParkWest took only such title as
Barmon then had, which interest was subject to the First and Second MERS Deeds of Trust.
Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Idaho Code is dedicated to the principal that trustees of deeds
of trust hold legal title to propelty (see particularly sections 45-1502 and 45-1513). Moreover,
the face of the First MERS Deed of Trust makes clear that "Borrower irrevocably grants and
conveys to Trustee, in trust, '"vith power of sale, the [Property]." Affidavit Of Ryan T.
McFarland In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion For
Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2010, Em. A, p. 3. That interest could not be
foreclosed by a stipulated judgment that First American, as trustee of the First MERS Deed of
Tmst was not party to, in a lawsuit that First American was not party to.

If ParkWest were permitted to eliminate a trustee's legal interest in property merely by
stipulating to ajudgment with a property owner, property owners generally would be at libelty to
collude with any purpOlted mechanic's lien claimant to strip lenders with deeds of trust or
ffi0l1gages on real property of their legal and contractual rights. A property owner who no longer
des ires her land to be burdened with an encumbrance could collude with a purported (even
fictitious) mechanic's lien claimant, the lien claimant could file suit without naming anyone
other than the property owner, stipulate to a judgment with that property owner, and then use that
judgment to strip the lender of its interest in the property. That technique could be used by
anyone - even an abjectly fraudulent cLaim could strip a lender of its rights. This is the very
result that the body of case law relied on by the Comt in reaching its judgment in this case is
designed to avoid. It is precisely what the Idaho Court of Appeals was guarding against when it
held" in Bonner Building Supply, Inc., that:
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I.C. § 45-] 202 does not enable a materialman to foreclose a lien as
against other interested parties without giving them notice of the
proceedings.
Therefore, although Bonner was not required to name Standard as
a party to the foreclosure action ... the failure to do so left
Standards' interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure.
Because Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six
months of the filing of its claim of lien, it lost its lien against the
property in regard to Standard.

Bonner Building Supply, Inc., 682 P.2d at 639. Due process protects against exactly the kind of
thing ParkWest urges for now. ParkWest's argument should be rejected.
C.

The Doctrine Of Merger Does Not Allow Park"Vest To Trump First American's
And Residential's Interest In The Property_
To the extent ParkWest is asserting that its (Bamson) Judgment lien and mechanic's Lien

"merged," such argument is self-defeating. Under the doctrine of merger, a lien holder's prior
lien is extinguished once the lien holder obtains title to the property. Estate of Skvorak v.

Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16,20,89 P.3d 856,860 (2004) (holding that where a
mortgagee obtained title to property via a quit claim deed, "merger would extinguish the
mortgage and such a result would not be in [the mortgagee's] interest"). If in fact ParkWest's
mechanic's Len merged with the Bamson Judgment lien, then ParkWest's mechanic's Lien was
extinguished and this case is even easier for the Court to resolve.
D.

The First NlERS Deed Of TrlLst Gives Homecomings The Right To Appoint A
Successor Trustee.
The fact that Homecomings recorded an Appointment Of Successor Trustee making First

American the Trustee of the First MERS Deed of Trust is irrelevant to the law that a mechanic's
lien claimant cannot foreclose the trustee of a deed of tnISt'S interest without making the trustee a
party to the case. The face of the First MERS Deed of Trust provides that "Lender may, for any
reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee
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appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to

all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law." Affidavit
Of Ryan T. McFarland In SUppOlt Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings. LLC's Motion
For Summary Judgment. filed November 17,2010, Exh. A, p. 13, par. 24.

IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, MERS requests that this Court deny ParkWest's Motions
For Reconsideration and To Alter Or Amend Judgment.
DATED THIS

k'L.~Yi

1'0

day of April, 2011.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

~

By

.;~
I
I

/'

Ry T.
Att
s for DefendantiCountercIaimant
Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC
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CANYON COUNTY CUlAK
T. CRAWFOAD. OEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JULIE BARNSON, MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC,
Defendants,
and
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL
ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware
Limited liability company,
Defendant/Intervenor.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-8274
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING PARKWEST'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT

--------------------------)
Procedural History
On February 16, 2011, this court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on a
number of pending motions, including Defendant Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On February 23, 2011, ParkWest filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 1, 2011, this
court entered a Judgment which, among other relief, dismissed ParkWest's claims against MERS
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and Residential. On March 4, 2011, ParkWest filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
ParkWest's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment was filed on March 7, 2011. On March 23, 2011, Residential filed its
memorandum in opposition to those motions and on March 28, 2011, ParkWest filed a Reply
memorandum.
Oral argument was held on March 30, 2011.

Robert Bums appeared on behalf of

ParkWest and Ryan McFarland appeared on behalf ofMERS and Residential. The court allowed
the parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs and those briefs were filed on April 15,
2011.

Standard of Review

IRCP II(a)(2)(B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of an interlocutory order prior to
the entry of a final judgment, or within fourteen (14) days of entry of the final judgment. The
decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is squarely within the court's discretion.
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007). When faced with such a decision the
court is directed to consider any new facts presented by the moving party that provide insight
into the correctness of the order to be reconsidered. Id, citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First
Natl. Bank, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). It is the burden of the party
seeking reconsideration to place those new facts before the court for reconsideration. While a
party may properly present new evidence on an IRCP U(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration,
that rule does not require new evidence and the lack of new evidence alone does not act as an
automatic denial of the motion for reconsideration but a trial court acts within the bounds of its
discretion in denying a motion for reconsideration when a moving party either fails to provide
new evidence or fails to direct the court to evidence already in the record that would raise a
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PARKWEST'S MOTION FOR
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genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App.
2006). This court incorporates herein its findings as set forth in the Memorandum Decision
previously issued on these issues. The court notes that ParkWest timely filed its Motion for
Reconsideration prior to the entry of the Judgment in this case.
The standard for a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to IRCP 59(e) varies
from the standard applicable to a motion for reconsideration. When considering a motion to alter
or amend a judgment, the court cannot consider new evidence. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v.
Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 200 P.3d 1180 (2009). The decision to alter or amend a judgment

pursuant to IRCP 59(e) is left to the discretion of the court and such a motion offers the court an
opportunity to correct errors or fact and/or law as a mechanism to correct the record prior to or in
lieu of an appeal. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008). See also Coeur
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank o/North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990).

ParkWest does not present new evidence in support of its arguments, but raises an issue not
previously briefed or addressed by the parties.

Since ParkWest timely filed its Motion for

Reconsideration prior to entry of the summary judgment and its Motion to Alter or Amend after
the entry of the summary jUdgment, the court will consider both motions applying the
appropriate applicable standards.

Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

ParkWest asks the court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment in favor of
Residential pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)(B). ParkWest also asks the court to alter or amend the
judgment upon reconsideration of its order granting summary judgment in favor of Residential
pursuant to IRCP 59(e). In support of its motion to alter or amend the judgment, ParkWest relies
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on the same legal authority, facts and arguments set forth in support of its motion for
reconsideration. ParkWest cites to First National Bank of Lewiston v. Hays, 7 Idaho 139,61 P.
287 (1900) and Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) in support of its
argument.

In this memorandum decision, the court refers to the Default Judgment Against Julie
Barnson Only filed October 7, 2008 as the "Bamson Judgment" in order to distinguish it from
the judgment entered by this court pursuant to its grant of Residential's motion for summary
judgment. ParkWest's argument is premised on the heretofore unaddressed legal significance of
the recorded Bamson Judgment as considered within the context of the factual and legal record
that is the basis of the court's February 16,2011 memorandum decision. ParkWest contends that
the recording of the Bamson Judgment prior to the trustee's transfer of the property at issue to
Residential by Trustee Deed vitiated the transfer or at the very least made it subordinate to the
Bamson Judgment lien. In asserting this argument, ParkWest does not appear to challenge the
court's previous ruling regarding the effect of ParkWest's failure to timely file suit against the
designated trustee of record in its effort to enforce its mechanic's lien. In its supporting
memorandum ParkWest concedes that neither party has previously addressed the effect of the
Bamson Judgment on the Residential's summary judgment motion. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and (ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, page 2).
Therefore, ParkWest now requests relief from the courts summary judgment decision on the
basis that Residential's interest in the property is subject to the judgment lien established when
ParkWest obtained and recorded the Bamson Judgment.

Residential, objects to ParkWest's

pending motions, and argues that the Summary Judgment entered by the court correctly resolves
the issues submitted to the court.
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The court fmds that the issue raised by ParkWest in the pending motions was not
previously addressed by either of the parties' in their briefing and arguments on Residential's
motion for summary judgment. The issue was asserted in ParkWest's Supplemental Amended
Complaint filed on September 14,2010. Therefore, the court will consider the issue raised in
ParkWest's pending motions to determine whether it should reconsider its previous decision.
The court's consideration of ParkWest's pending motions is limited to the narrow issue of the
legal effect of recording the Barnson Judgment relative to prioritizing the parties' respective
interests in the property. The court is not otherwise revisiting its findings of fact and legal
conclusions as contained in its memorandum decision.

Relation Back Theory

The first prong of ParkWest's argument is that when First American Title Insurance
Company conveyed the property to Residential by Trustee's Deed on July 9, 2009, the
conveyance was made subject to the Barnson Judgment lien. ParkWest asserts that the priority
date of the Barnson Judgment lien relates back to March 18, 2006 when ParkWest commenced
its work on the property because the mechanic's claim of lien which was the precursor to this
lawsuit (and the Barnson Judgment) attached as ofthat date.
The court finds that on October 7,2008, a Default Judgment Against Julie Barnson Only
was filed in this case.

The Barnson Judgment was a result of a stipulation between ParkWest

and Barnson, and provided that ParkWest was entitled to the following:
2. ParkWest shall have judgment against Barnson to the extent of her interest in
the Property, but not personally, for the following amounts as pled in the SAC!:

I

The SAC is the Second Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien filed on October 6, 2008.
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$141,208.39 for the amount owed to ParkWest as of November 28, 2006, with
respect to its construction of improvements to the Property ...
Default Judgment Against Julie Barnson Only, filed October 7, 2008, ~2.
The Bamson Judgment was recorded October 9, 2008 as Instrument No. 2008054565 in
the records of Canyon County, Idaho. (Affidavit of Ryan McFarland, Exhibit A, filed on March
23,2011).
A judgment lien is a creature of statute, and as such the respective rights of the parties
must be determined by the applicable statute. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d 913
(1963). In this case, ParkWest obtained a judgment against Barnson and recorded it with the
Canyon County Recorder. Thus, the Barnson Judgment became a judgment lien pursuant to
Idaho Code 10-1110 which states "from the time of such recording, and not before, the judgment
so recorded becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not
exempt from execution, owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the
expiration of the lien." I.e. 10-111 0 (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute states
that the judgment lien is created at the time the judgment is recorded.
ParkWest relies on a number of cases from other jurisdictions to support this position.
The court has carefully reviewed those cases and it finds that they are not applicable or
persuasive to the facts of this case. For example, ParkWest cites to

us. v. Security Trust & Sav.

Bank of San Diego, 340 U.S. 47, 71 S. Ct. 111 (1950) in support of its claim that the doctrine of
"relation back" should apply in this case. In that case, the United States Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether a United States tax lien had priority over an attachment lien when the
tax lien was filed subsequent to the date of the attachment lien but prior to the date the judgment
on the attachment lien was recorded. This court notes that the United States Supreme Court was
dealing with an attachment lien in that case which is not the factual situation in this case.
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Further, the United States Supreme Court did not apply the "relation back" doctrine, finding
instead that the asserted relation back would not apply because the attachment lien had not been
reduced to judgment at the time that the tax liens were recorded, thus the attachment lien was not
given priority. This court reads the Us. v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank of San Diego case as
supporting a literal, plain language interpretation of I.e. 10-1110 that unless and until a judgment
is recorded, there is no judgment lien.
Similarly, the court does not find the other cases cited by ParkWest to be of assistance to
this court in addressing this issue because the cases are factually distinguishable from this case.
None of the cited cases involve a judgment lien arising out of a mechanic's lien. The cited cases
primarily involve the law of attachment and attachment liens which is not the issue presented in
this case. In Idaho, attachment and writs of attachment are governed by Idaho Code 8-501 et

seq, a separate title than the judgment lien provision of Idaho 10-1110. Finally, to the extent that
the cited cases actually address and apply the "relation back" principle, they primarily do so
because the specific statutory provisions of the named jurisdictions provide for it.
ParkWest has not cited any authority from the State of Idaho in which the "relation back"
doctrine has been applied to a factual scenario similar to the record of this case. ParkWest has
not demonstrated to this court why it should disregard the specific language of Idaho Code 101110 that specifically provides that the date the judgment recorded pursuant to that section is the
effective date for establishing lien priority.
In support of its relation back theory, ParkWest has also cited the recent Idaho case

Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, _

247 P.3d 620, 627 (2010) in

which the Idaho Supreme Court stated "a mechanic's lien, 'if any exists at all, relates back to the
date of the commencement of the work or improvement or the commencement to furnish the
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material. '" Id, citing White v. Constitution Min. & Mill. Co., 56 Idaho 403, 55 P.2d 152 (1936).
This court does not take issue with the Terra-West decision.

However, as this court has

previously ruled, any mechanic's lien asserted by ParkWest was invalid against the designated
Trustee under the Deed of Trust at issue in this case because ParkWest failed to timely name the
designated trustee as a defendant in its mechanics lien foreclosure suit.

The Trustee

subsequently conveyed the property to Residential unencumbered by ParkWest's mechanic's
lien.
The court does not find the "relation back" theory advanced by ParkWest is applicable to
the specific facts of this case and as noted above, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, has
determined that the authority cited by ParkWest from other jurisdictions is neither binding, nor
persuasive to the court in its consideration of this issue. The provisions of Idaho Code 10-1110
clearly provide that the Bamson Judgment was effective as a judgment lien on October 9,2008,
the date it was recorded.

Constructive Notice Theory

ParkWest also argues that Residential acquired the property, pursuant to the Trustee's
Deed, subject to ParkWest's judgment lien because it had constructive notice of the judgment
lien at the time the property was transferred to Residential pursuant to the Trustee Deed. In
support of this argument, ParkWest cites to Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048
(1983). Residential disputes the applicability of the Long case to the facts of this case.

In considering this argument, the court first reviews the relevant history of this case. The
court finds that on November 14,2006, the Deed of Trust was recorded with the Canyon County
Recorder as Instrument No. 200690998. That document provides that Julie Bamson was the
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borrower, Homecomings was the lender, MERS was the beneficiary of the security interest and
that Transnation was the trustee. The document also details that the "Borrower irrevocably
grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, the power of sale," and that "Borrower understands and
agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interest granted by Borrower .... but, if necessary
... MERS has the right: to foreclose and sell the Property." As is typical of Deeds of Trust, the
document puts the Borrower on notice of the consequences of default, including forfeiture and
sale of the property. Finally, the document provides that the Lender may appoint a successor
trustee.
As alleged in the Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien filed on August 7, 2007,
ParkWest filed a Claim of Lien on November 28, 2006. The Complaint also alleges that on
April 13, 2007, Barnson filed bankruptcy and ParkWest was granted relief to seek foreclosure of
its lien rights.
On June 28, 2007, an Appointment of Successor Trustee was recorded with the Canyon
County Recorder as Instrument No. 2007044840 appointing First American Title Insurance
Company as trustee of the November 14, 2006 Deed of Trust.
As noted above, the Barnson Judgment was recorded on October 9, 2008. On July 20,
2009, a Trustee's Deed was recorded with the Canyon County Recorder as Instrument No.
2009036841. That Trustee's Deed states that after Barnson's default on the Deed of Trust, and
all notice and statutory requirements were complied with that the property was sold at a
Trustee's Sale on July 9, 2009.
ParkWest argues that the Long case stands for the proposition that a trustee's interest in
property under a deed of trust is subject to divestiture as a result of subsequent legal proceedings
involving the grantor of the deed of trust. That is that Barnson's stipulation re: the Barnson
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judgment was an intervening event that limited First American's interests as the trustee. In
addition, ParkWest argues that Long establishes that a grantor of a deed of trust retains all
ownership attributes other than the power of sale retained by the trustee and that as such the only
interests that Residential acquired in the property were those held by Bamson, and therefore such
interest is limited by entry of the Bamson Judgment. This court, however, does not read the
Long decision in the same manner as ParkWest. What ParkWest fails to recognize in its reliance

on Long is the nature of the various transactions between the parties in that case and the impact
on the parties of the applicable bankruptcy statutes. The Long court stated:
At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy, he had a legal
interest in the property which was good against all person except the Lewis
County Abstract Company, which held nothing more than the power of sale upon
the happening of certain contingencies. Williams' interest (comprised of all other
attributes of ownership) passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Section 541 of Title
11 U.S.C. provides:
"Property of the estate. (a) The commencement ofa case under section 301,302,
or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located: (1) ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case."
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable interests of
Williams in the subject property to A vco. Avco's interest as beneficiary under the
Deed of Trust merged with this purchased interest. Thus, A vco was the o\vner of
the property and entitled to possession subject only to the satisfaction of the
homestead interest of Williams and to Long's inferior judgment lien.
Consequently, when Lewis County Abstract executed the Deed of Reconveyance,
it conveyed no interest.
Long subsequently purchased the property from Avco and stands
Avco's position.

III

Long, 105 Idaho at 588, 671 P.2d at 1051.

As the above cited analysis shows, once the bankruptcy trustee obtained all interests in
the property, it was able to convey the entirety of the interests in the property back to Avco and
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A vco was thereafter in the position to convey the property to Long, the judgment lien holder.
The court does not find that the facts of Long are commensurate with the facts of this case. The
Long decision is based on the unique nature of the transaction involved and effect of the

bankruptcy statutes on the respective interests of the parties in that case.
The court is also guided by the following relevant Idaho Code sections regarding deeds of
trusts, trustee's sales and priority of interests:
4S-1S03.TRANSFERS IN TRUST TO SECURE OBLIGATION -FORECLOSURE.
(1) Transfers in trust of any estate in real property as defined in section 451502(5), Idaho Code, may hereafter be made to secure the performance of an
obligation of the grantor or any other person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
Where any transfer in trust of any estate in real property is hereafter made to
secure the performance of such an obligation, a power of sale is hereby conferred
upon the trustee to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for which such
transfer is security, and a deed of trust executed in conformity with this act may
be foreclosed by advertisement and sale in the manner hereinafter provided, or, at
the option of beneficiary, by foreclosure as provided by law for the foreclosure of
mortgages on real property.
4S-1S06.MANNER OF FORECLOSURE -- NOTICE -- SALE.
(10) The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest in the property
which the grantor had, or had the power to convey, at the time of the execution by
him of the trust deed together with any interest the grantor or his successors in
interest acquired after the execution of such trust deed.
4S-1S07.PROCEEDS OF SALE -- DISPOSITION.
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows:
(1) To the expenses of the sale, including a reasonable charge by the
trustee and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(2) To the obligation secured by the trust deed.
(3) To any persons having recorded liens subsequent to the interest of the
trustee in the trust deed as their interests may appear.
(4) The surplus, if any, to the grantor of the trust deed or to his successor
in interest entitled to such surplus.
4S-1S0S.FINALITY OF SALE.
A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and terminate all interest in
the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom notice is given
under section 45-1506, Idaho Code, and of any other person claiming by, through
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or under such persons and such persons shall have no right to redeem the property
from the purchaser at the trustee's sale.

In reviewing both the record of this case along with the relevant statutory authority cited
above the court comes to the following conclusions.

Bamson executed the Deed of Trust

conveying to the Trustee, Transnation, the power to appoint a successor trustee which
Transnation did when it appointed First American. The Deed of Trust also gives the Trustee the
power, upon certain contingencies, such as default (as was the case with Bamson) to initiate a
foreclosure action and sell the property pursuant to a Trustee's Sale in accordance with Idaho
law. First American did so upon Bamson's default. Nothing in the record indicates that this is
disputed or that the sale was not valid. In addition, the court finds nothing in the record to
indicate that First American, at any time, gave up any of its rights pursuant to the Trust Deed.
Also instructive to the court are the following Idaho Code sections:
Idaho Code 55-606.Conclusiveness of conveyance -- Bona fide purchasers.
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration,
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly
recorded.
Idaho Code 55-811.Record as notice.
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified,
and recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for
record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and
mortgagee)es.
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified,
and recorded as prescribed by law, and which is executed by one who thereafter
acquires an interest in said real property by a conveyance which is constructive
notice as aforesaid, is, from the time such latter conveyance is filed with the
recorder for record, constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees.
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The court finds that I.e. 55-606 protects the interests of Residential because when
Bamson executed the Deed of Trust and it was recorded, the Deed of Trust became the first
encumbrance on the property. At the time of the Trustee's Sale, First American was the grantor
of the property, having obtained the status and ability to sell due to Barnson's default. As such,
when the property was then conveyed from First American to Residential, Residential's interest
was superior to all claims that arose subsequent to the recordation of the Deed of Trust. See
Estate ofSkvorak v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16,89 P.3d 856 (2004). Pursuant to
I.C. 45-1506, both Bamson and ParkWest retained certain rights of redemption following the
Trustee's Sale and neither chose to exercise those options.
Similarly, the court finds that because the Deed of Trust was recorded prior to the lien
foreclosure lawsuit filed by Parkwest, Parkwest was on notice of the named Trustee's interest in
the property. ParkWest never named the designated trustee as a defendant in its mechanic's lien
foreclosure lawsuit within the prescribed period allowed to perfect the lien under the law.
Therefore, the asserted lien fails as against any interest assigned to the designated trustee.
Thereafter, when ParkWest recorded the Bamson Judgment, ParkWest was on notice, pursuant
to I.C. 55-811 that its judgment lien would be secondary Gunior) to the Deed of Trust.
ParkWest's arguments belie the fact that Bamson's Judgment lien never had priority over the
Deed of Trust and the interests held in that trust by the Trustee as a result of Bamson's default.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, ParkWest's February 23, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration of Order on Residential's Motion for Summary Judgment and March 4, 2011
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment are denied. In making this decision the court reaffirms its
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February 16, 2011 order granting summary judgment in favor of Residential. In making this
decision, the court has considered the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits offered
in support and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and finds that there still are no
genuine issues of material fact and that Residential is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
oflaw to the extent previously ordered.
~
~
Dated this\ q da~y.-::..0Jf~7'--I--"--' 20

JJ
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on ~ day of June 2011, s/he served a true and correct copy of
the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner described:
•

upon counsel for plaintiff,
Robert B. Burns
Moffatt, Thomas Barrett, Rock and Fields, Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701

•

upon counsel for defendants
Ryan T. McFarland
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis, and Hawley, LLP
877 West Main St., Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

•

upon counsel for Julie Bamson
David E. Wishney
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise, Idaho 83701-0837

and/or when slhe deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

Chris Yamamoto, Clerk of the Court

By: _ _~--,--I
_ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk of the Court
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Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744

JUN 2 1 2011

MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
.J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
rbb@moffatt.com
23095.0001
Attomeys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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P ARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
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NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
DefendantiCounterclaimantRespondent,
and
JULIE G. BARNS ON, an unmarried woman;
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/kla
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants.
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT AND ITS ATTORNEYS STEPHEN C.
HARDESTY AND RYAN T. MCFARLAND, OF THE FIRM HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, 877 W. MAIN STREET, SUITE 1000, P.O. BOX 1617,
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-1617, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, ParkWest Homes LLC, appeals against the above-

named respondent, Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC, to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the final judgment entered in the above-entitled action on March 1,2011, by the Hon.
Bradly S. Ford, presiding.
2.

The appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment

described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to, Rules 11(a)(1) and 14(a),
I.AR.

3.

The preliminary issues on appeal are:
(a)

Did the district court err in ruling that the lis pendens and judgment the

appellant recorded against the real property at issue (the "Property") did not provide the
respondent with constructive notice of this civil action and the appellant's lien in the Propeliy7
(b)

Did the district court err in ruling that the priority date of the appellant's

claimed mechanic's lien in the Property was lost when the district court reduced the appellant's
claimed lien to a finaljudgrnent against the owner of the Property?
(c)

Did the district court err in ruling that the "law of the case" doctrine does

not preclude the respondent from litigating new challenges to the validity of the appellant's lien
in the Property, which the supreme court held to be valid in the prior appeal in this civil action
(Supreme Court Docket No. 36246-2009)7
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(d)

Did the district court err in ruling that the respondent acquired the

Property free of the appellant's lien, because the trustee under the deed of trust who deeded the
Property to the respondent was not named as a party defendant in this civil action?
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record in this action.

5.

No reporter's transcript is requested.

6.

In lieu of the standard record, the appellant requests only the following documents

be included in the clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, LA.R.:
(a)

Register of actions;

(b)

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.' s Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed October 2,2008;
(c)

Default Judgment Against Julie G. Barnson Only, filed October 7,2008;

(d)

Affidavit of David Zawadzki, filed November 10, 2008;

(e)

Judgment, filed January 26,2009;

(f)

Remittitur (Supreme Court Docket No. 36246-2009), filed July 22, 2010;

(g)

Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien, filed September 14,

(h)

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 's Answer to Plaintiff's

2010;

Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien, filed October 7,2010;
(i)

Stipulation to Intervene, filed November 4,2010;

(j)

Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention, filed November 15,2010;

(k)

Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed November 17,2010;
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(1)

Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Residential Funding Real

Estate Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2010;
(m)

Answer to Counterclaim in Intervention, filed November 30, 2010;

(n)

Memorandum in Opposition to Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings,

LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 27,2010;
(0)

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine, filed January 5, 2011;

(p)

Memorandum Decision and Order on MERS' Motion for Protective

Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to Dismiss, Residential's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine, filed February 16,2011;
(q)

Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Residential's Motion for

Summary Judgment; Notice of Hearing, filed February 23,2011;
(r)

Judgment, filed March 1,2011;

(s)

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; Notice of Hearing, filed March 4,

(t)

Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and

2011;

(ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 7, 2011;
(u)

Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland in Support of Defendant Residential

Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 23,2011;
(v)

Plaintiffs Reply in Support of (i) Motion for Reconsideration and

(ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed March 28,2011;
(w)

Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of (i) Motion for

Reconsideration and (ii) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed April 15, 2011;
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(x)

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying ParkWest' s Motion for

Reconsideration - and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed June 14,2011;

7.

(y)

This Notice of Appeal; and

(z)

Table of contents and index.

I certify:
(a)

nla;

(b)

nla;

(c)

that the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been

(d)

that the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

paid;

to Rule 20, LAR.
DATED this 20th day of June 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By~~______+.r_________________

Robert B. BUI s - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of June 2011, I caused a tme and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Stephen C. Hardesty
Ryan T. McFarland

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP

877 W. Main St., Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617
Facsimile (208) 954-5223 and (208) 954-5236
David E. Wishney

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW

300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise,ID 83701
Facsimile (208) 342-5749

~Li1~
/tofertB.
s
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Stephen C. Hardesty ISB No. 4214
Ryan T. McFarland ISB No. 7347
Jake D. McGrady ISB No. 8209
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 954-5236
Email: shardesty@hawleytroxell.com
rmcfarland@hawleytroxell.com

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Respondent Residential Funding Real
Estate Holdings, LLC

n-J THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PARKWEST HOMES LLC, an Idaho limited )
liability company,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.

)
)
JULIE G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman; )
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
)
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
)
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
)
Homecomings Financial, LLC (f/k/a
)
Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.), a
)
Delaware limited liability company; and
)
DOES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants
)
and
)
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE )
)
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
)
liability company,
)
)
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
)

Case No. CV 07-8274
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
RECORD
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, ROBERT B.
BURNS OF THE FIRM MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS,
CHARTERED, 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD., 10TH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 829, BOISE,
IDAHO 83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding

hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal:
1.

N/A

2.

Clerk's Record:
(a)

Original Verified Complaint To Foreclose Lien, filed August 7,2007;

(b)

First Amended Verified Complaint To Foreclose Lien, filed September 12,

(c)

Stipulation For Entry Of Default Judgment, filed September 29,2008;

(d)

Affidavit of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Mortgage Electronic

2007;

Registration Systems, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment, filed October 2,2008;
(e)

Memorandum In Support Of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,

Inc. 's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed October 2,2008;
(f)

Second Amended Complaint To Foreclose Lien, filed October 6,2008;

(g)

Reply To Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. 's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2008;
(h)

Memorandum Decision On Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration

Systems, Inc. 's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed January 6,2009;
(i)

Notice of Appeal, filed March 9, 2009;

(j)

2010 Opinion No. 68 (Supreme Court Docket No. 36246-2009), filed June

25,2010;
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(k)

Order On Stipulation To Intervene, filed November 10, 2010;

(1)

Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Motion To Dismiss

MERS, filed November 12,2010;
(m)

Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Motion For Protective

Order, filed November 12,2010;
(n)

Memorandum In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings,

LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 17,2010;
(0)

Affidavit Of Ryan T. McFarland In Support Of Opposition To Motion To

Compel, filed December 2,2010;
(p)

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Residential Funding Real Estate

Holdings, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed January 5, 2011;
(q)

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion In Limine, filed January 12,

(r)

Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's Opposition

2011;

To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration And Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment, filed
March 23, 2011;
(s)

Defendant Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings, LLC's

Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration And
Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment, filed Apri115, 2011.

3.

N/A

4.

N/A
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5.

I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the

clerk of the district court or administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED THIS

~

~ day of June, 2011.
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By __~__~~________________________
Rya
cFarland, ISB No. 7347
Attorneys for Respondent Residential Funding
Real Estate Holdings, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t)

li

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of June, 2011, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR A DITIONAL RECORD by the method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:
Robert B. Burns
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
Telecopy

+

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
~ Telecopy

David E. Wishney
Attorney at Law
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 837
Boise, ID 83701-0837
[Attorney for Defendant Julie G. Barnson]

R
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
F I A.~

i::fu

JUN 2 9 2011
P ARKWEST HOMES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
JULY G. BARNSON, an unmarried woman;
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, as nominee for
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC aka
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORL,
INC.,
Defendants,
and
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Intervenor-Respondent.

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T RANDALL, DEPUTY

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 38919-2011
Canyon County Docket No. 2007-8274

-

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed May 18, 2009, in appeal No.
36246, Parkwest Homes v. Bamson; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior
appeal No. 36246.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 36246. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD shall be
filed with this Court after settlement.
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DATED this 2.2!:day of June 2011.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

PARKWEST HOMES, LLC., eta!.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJULIE G. BARNS ON, etal.,
Defendants,

And
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC., etal.,
Intervenor-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-08274*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
exhibits were sent:

NONE

IN THE WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _-'--_ day of

Sf(li:
;

,2011.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
In
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF CANYON

PARKWEST HOMES, LLC., eta!.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJULIE G. BARNSON, eta!.,
Defendants,

And
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL ESTATE
HOLDINGS, LLC., eta!.,
Intervenor-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-08274*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court ofthe Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Limited Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Limited Record of the pleadings and documents
as requested, however, no duplicate documents were included from prior appeal No.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---;:~'-- day

'--::..&:...fJ"'-'--'---' 2011.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
III
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PARKWEST HOMES LLC., etal.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJULIE G. BARNSON, etal.,
Defendants,

And
RESIDENTIAL FUNDING REAL
ESTATE HOLDING, LLC., etal.,
Intervenor-Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 38919-2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows:
Robert B. Burns, MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD.
Stephen C. Hardesty, Ryan T. McFarland, Jake D. McGrady,
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of

c::
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this --'-"-'-_ day of----',,"-)""-·~.....,.f'+r-'--;
_,2011.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
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